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I. INTRODUCTION
On Christmas morning, a little boy finds wrapped presents meticulously
placed beneath a modest tree that his parents bought and decorated
weeks earlier in the family living room. He tears through the wrapping
of several boxes and finds in one the small plastic oven for which he
begged his parents after seeing an advertisement during morning cartoons
the month prior. His parents help him assemble the toy after reading its
instructions closely and admonishing him to avoid the heating element
with great care. The boy plays with the new toy for several hours, baking
muffins from a simple recipe provided by the manufacturer. Suddenly
and inexplicably, the heating element comes loose, drops several inches
to its plastic housing, melts through to the table underneath, and catches
fire. Before the flames can be extinguished, the boy is severely burned
on both hands, requiring heavy medical attention at a local burn center.
With little doubt that the boy in this situation will bring a claim for his
injuries, the question becomes whether that claim ought to be governed
by state or federal legal principles. Should the norms preventing this
type of harm and the conduct that generates it be community-specific or
nationally uniform in nature? Realistically, the answer may favor one
party: a community standard can better reflect the experience and meaning
of a child whose small hands were burned on Christmas, but a national
standard may better reflect the expectations of a mass-market commercial
manufacturer operating in numerous American states at once.
The choices reflect two competing visions of how American tort
liability should work. The first says that liability should remain a strict
matter of state common law because torts derive basic legitimacy from
community values.1 The second holds that torts should be unified across
the fifty states to account for faster and wider movement of risk-creating

1. E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 768 (1995).
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activity and that this is more predictable for companies in the age of
mass markets, modern finance, and information economics.2 The latter
promotes a form of value-globalization; the former seems to resist it.
Both are propositions as much about the role of cultural difference as
about legal rules and processes.
Critics of the status quo tend to undervalue or exaggerate this role.
Among them, communitarians argue tort law has seen too much
federalization3 and strayed from the community-based normativity of the
common law.4 Others, unitarians, argue for greater federalization and
its benefits to mass-market corporate actors.5 Against proponents of both
arguments, this Article defends current contours in the federalization of tort
law wherein norms have been federalized in discrete substantive areas
although remaining shielded from federal incursion in others. As
suggested here, it becomes the task of judges to develop and refine these
contours in the same fashion that they serve public law needs elsewhere
through adjudication. In support of this claim, this Article develops what I
term the “federalism function”—the capacity for torts disputes to implicate
the balance of federal and state authority and thereby reinforce or recalibrate
that balance in large or small measure. Indeed, as problems of scale cut
increasingly across political persuasion and economic worldview,6 the

2. See, e.g., Pamela M. Madas, Note, To Settlement Classes and Beyond: A
Primer on Proposed Methods for Federalizing Mass Tort Litigation, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 540, 566 (1997).
3. I use this term to mean the process by which national norms are brought to
interact with state rules. This differs from common uses to mean the process of
separating and maintaining state and national sovereignty or the process of entirely
displacing state rules with national ones. Federalization here means the installation of
new requirements to perennially balance state and national interests in a growing variety
of tort actions.
4. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional
and Practical Advantages of the State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort
Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 228, 274 (1994).
5. E.g., Madas, supra note 2, at 566.
6. As many have pointed out, globalization is not exclusively liberal or
antiliberal. Although economic and financial globalization has proliferated through
liberal policies, it has been met with strong resistance by increasingly transnationally
networked social movements such as the World Social Forum and Occupy. See
generally CHARLES LINDHOLM & JOSÉ PEDRO ZÚQUETE, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD:
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2010) (discussing the World Social
Forum); W.J.T. MITCHELL, BERNARD E. HARCOURT & MICHAEL TAUSSIG, OCCUPY: THREE
INQUIRIES IN DISOBEDIENCE (2013) (discussing Occupy).
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balance of central and local power through federalism becomes a key
implication of many torts disputes today.
This discussion is overdue in light of wider debates about federal
preemption and state sovereignty. Immigration reform and marijuana
regulation are but two hot-button issues that illustrate the contemporary
struggle over federalism.7 More than tort law, these areas implicate
what many have come to describe as “global governance”—the effort to
assert uniform norms across ever-wider geographic and political distances.8
Because immigration and marijuana policies necessarily affect the flow
of people and things across the international border, they more
understandably implicate and undermine the idea of states’ rights. Tort
law, meanwhile, still deals in cognizable, individual harms to person and
property and has been the domain of state authority for centuries.9
Nevertheless, tortious conduct increasingly flows across state boundaries
via mass-market actors and increased communication technologies.10
Adjudication in tort disputes increasingly takes the form of “public” or
“regulatory” law.11 It is then, in light of federalism’s widespread influence
in policy discussions across the spectrum, not surprising to find the
integrity of state common law up for reconsideration in many tort
cases.12 This reconsideration forms the federalism function.
Like all debated “functions” of the tort law, the federalism function is
one that coexists with others and lurks whether or not dispute stakeholders,
advocates, or adjudicators are contemporaneously aware of it. More
importantly, recognition of this function does not prescribe immediate
outcomes in any given set of legal disputes. Rather, it requires that the
adjudicator understand how it may be serving to collaterally arrange or
rearrange contours of federal and state power. This recognition overlaps
perhaps most with conceptions of torts as “public law”—conceptions
that hail optimal deterrence, loss distribution, or social justice over other

7. See Jonathan H. Adler, Marijuana and Federalism, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Apr. 8, 2013, 7:27 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/08/marijuana-and-federalism/;
Tamar Jacoby, What if Justices Let States Make Immigration Policy?, CNN, http://www.
cnn.com/2012/04/24/opinion/jacoby-immigration-supreme-court (last updated Apr. 24,
2012, 8:58 AM).
8. See Luis Cabrera, Introduction to GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL GOVERNMENT:
INSTITUTIONAL VISIONS FOR AN EVOLVING WORLD SYSTEM 1, 2 (Luis Cabrera ed., 2011).
9. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed. 2011); see infra note 23.
10. See infra Part V.B.3.
11. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 581 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573–81 (2009) (discussing the
argument that federal drug regulation preempts state negligence claims).
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competing functions in this area.13 Although some dispute the righteousness
of treating torts as public law,14 that approach has garnered widespread
theoretical and practical acceptance since the mid-twentieth century.15
On that account, this proposal is a logical extension of the current
tendency to view torts as a preeminent legal site for social and economic
engineering rather than simple compensation.16 In the struggle to balance
federal and state power and cultural legitimacy of norms, tort law
functions as the “front line”17 where such balancing has greatest impact.18
At the same time, my goal is also to confront simplistic arguments that
unilaterally resist tort federalization in the name of American
communitarianism. Those arguments, probably represent nostalgia for a
mythic national past in which interpersonal disputes could be easily
resolved through appeal to the putative common and heterogeneous
wisdom of “community.”19 In accord with scholars of the history and
sociology of nationalism and citizenship, I consider such a past socially
constructed through its uncritical weaving into the tapestry of American
legal culture—and therefore worthy of critical revisitation.20
In the following pages, this Article will situate the federalism function
among existing scholarly frameworks and assess the “contoured” approach
to federal and state power balancing across the existing subject matter of
torts. Part II will assess conflicting characterizations of tort law as on
one hand “private” and on the other “public” law. Part III will define and
explain competing functions of tort law with an eye to whether federalism
fits the common criteria of these coexisting objectives, goals, purposes,
and methods for adjudication. In Part IV, the Article will explore historical
13. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
178 (expanded ed. 2003); Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First Century Tort Theories: The
Internalist/Externalist Debate, 88 IND. L.J. 419, 422 n.18 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm
Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 580–81 (1994).
15. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513,
523–24 (2003); Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2009).
16. See Klass, supra note 15, at 1509–10.
17. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 537
(2011).
18. See Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory
Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 631, 653 (2010).
19. See infra notes 31–32, 103–05 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VI.
20. See infra notes 31–32, 103–05 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VI.
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and contemporary roles of federalism to understand why this process
becomes so deeply implicated in the resolution of civil justice claims.
Part V will explore patterns in modern tort federalization to draw
observations about the way this process partakes in American nationhood
and legal culture.21 Its first subpart explores federalization in the name
of constitutional rights initially with respect to free speech in the theories
of defamation, privacy, and emotional distress. It then looks to
federalization under due process jurisprudence in public takings and civil
damage awards. The second subpart reviews federal preemption—the
displacement of state common law actions by express or implied national
legislative purpose. That discussion will take the reader through preemption
approaches in transportation and auto safety, food and drug regulation,
environmental protection, and employment claims. Although jurisprudence
across these discrete industries has cross-pollinated in recent decades,
viewing them serially in this fashion, hopefully, will make better sense
of the sociocultural logics underpinning preemption—even if the rules
themselves still appear quite nebulous today.22 Finally, Part VI will offer a
discussion of these various substantive areas to support the general
proposition that current struggles to balance state and federal authority—
the federalism function—form a legitimate new policy function of torts
today.
II. FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC LAW
“The law of torts has traditionally been the province of state common
law.” This truism forms some part of most introductory remarks on the
federalization of tort law.23 Its utterance serves several key narrative

21. Absent from Part V are discussions of mass tort litigation and federal tort
reform. Though germane to an analysis of the social logic of federalism, these topics are
distinct from those addressed here for particular reasons. The rules regarding mass tort
actions are more properly the province of civil procedure and indeed are governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s section on class action filing and removal.
Meanwhile, federal tort reform has been well charted by numerous policy articles, white
papers, and documentary films. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of
the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 439 (2006); HOT COFFEE: IS
JUSTICE BEING SERVED? (HBO Films 2011). More importantly, it has been largely
unsuccessful to date. See Hubbard, supra, at 483.
22. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug
Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 81 (2008).
23. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 15, at 1504 (“Along with public health and safety,
tort law is seen as a classic area of ‘traditional state concern’ even as Congress and
federal agencies play an ever-increasing role in regulating drugs, consumer products, the
environment, and many other substantive areas that frequently are the subject of state tort
law claims.”); see also WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND
QUESTIONS, at xxxvii (2d ed. 2009) (“Until well into the twentieth century most
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purposes. First, it creates a temporal break between tradition and modernity
in the law. Even without further context, this characterization of torts
past immediately evokes thoughts of a torts present and more importantly
sets up the dynamic quality of the civil justice system for the future.
Second, the above characterization serves to establish geopolitical
variability in tort principles and dispositions across the various U.S.
states, a quality that is often emphasized to remind students to resist easy
generalization in this domain of the law.24 Several have also described
this over time as the experimental quality of tort law—one that situates it
as an ideal “laboratory” for ductile social engineering experiments.25
And finally, a third implication of the above truism is the possibility of a
more localized cultural fit between rules of law, community values, and
dispute outcomes.26
These aspects of a torts-as-state-common-law formulation reveal an
inherent conflict between visions and uses of torts as private and public
law. On one hand, the closer cultural fit of traditional torts meant that
the legal outcome of a dispute would resonate with local community
values and satisfy private parties that corrective justice had been served.
On the other hand, high variability between state rules would complicate
the normative effect upon multistate actors, especially corporate tortfeasors,
and burden national markets in goods and services with a layer of
unpredictability. To mitigate the latter problem, efforts were needed to
standardize tort liability in ways that could liberate large players in the
national marketplace. For this to occur, torts would need to be
reconceptualized as primarily a domain of public law.
According to many, this is indeed what happened. Alexandra Klass
writes that among the two approaches, “[t]he first and dominant . . . sees
tort law as a branch of public regulatory law intended to serve state
interests of deterring undesirable conduct, compensating victims of
wrongdoing, and spreading societal losses.”27 This shift has been credited
American tort law was common law. . . .”); Robert L. Rabin, Federalism & the Tort
System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (“Tort law in America is built on the bedrock of
state common law.”); Roger Transgrud, Federalism and Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 2263, 2266 (2000) (“[A]s we debate what to do about mass tort litigation, we are
intruding into two areas that for two centuries have been left to the states.”).
24. See Klass, supra note 15, at 1504.
25. See id.
26. See Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 631.
27. Klass, supra note 15, at 1505; see also id. at 1506 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
failed to recognize the private law aspects of tort in its recent decisions, which has
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to three lines of scholarly thought and their leading figures. John Goldberg
lists these schools to be (1) loss distribution headed by Roger Traynor
and Fleming James, (2) loss shifting and deterrence represented by William
Prosser, and (3) social utility led by Guido Calabresi and Richard
Posner.28 “Although nominally private disputes,” Goldberg explains,
“tort cases were, in their view, occasions for public lawmaking: an
exercise by judges and juries of regulatory authority delegated to them
by legislatures through the creation of the court system.”29 With wide
acceptance of the above theories, then, the past ninety years have seen a
marked shift toward widespread acceptance of the public law conception.30
In one sense, this move follows a larger evolutionary pattern described
by social theorists toward the increased reliance upon abstract institutions as
societies sought to manage larger populations and greater complexity.
The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies once described this development
memorably as a shift from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft—from a form of
social organization rooted in communities and families to one based
upon impersonal social relations represented by corporations, banks, and
the state.31 Elsewhere, a similar shift was said to mark the emergence of
modern nationalism as a preeminent form of belonging in the new states
divided by vast distances, ethnic differences, and latent class conflict.32
Together, these parallel evolutionary theories seem to validate emergence of
a public law conception of torts in the twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.
On the other hand, several have come to view federalization as a
counter-narrative—a story that contradicts the larger story of American
tort law as a body of doctrine rooted in community values properly
represented by state common law. Accordingly, that story holds that

allowed it to displace more easily tort law under doctrines of preemption and due
process.”). But see DOBBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 13 (“Many lawyers distinguishing
regulation from tort law would perhaps think first of the procedural incidents of the two
systems. Tort law is court law. The victim of a wrong sues. The victim does not rely on
others to enforce rights. Suit is in a court (usually nearby) and one that is open to all
individuals. Most notably, the facts in the suit are decided by a jury if either party
requests it, not by a judge or an administrator. Probably no practicing lawyers would
think that tort law and regulatory law systems are alike.”).
28. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 581–82.
29. Id. at 581 (citing Goldberg, supra note 15, at 521–28; Leon Green, Tort Law
Public Law in Disguise (pt. 2), 38 TEX. L. REV. 257 (1960)) (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 583 (citing the 1930s as the decade of origin for this trend).
31. See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 17–19 (Jose Harris
ed., Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1887).
32. See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (new ed. 2006).
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“[s]tates [a]re in a [b]etter [p]osition to [s]erve [l]ocal [n]eeds.”33
Perhaps more importantly, the shift away from a pure common law
corpus is said to marginalize the state court judge—a key figure whose
position is said to render the person inherently more in tune with folk
ideas of fairness—and the state legislature—a group more beholden to
the local electorate and its “representation.”34 Local attitudes and ideals
change; legal doctrines may evolve to better achieve just outcomes.
But, support for state common law autonomy is not necessarily limited
to private law exponents. There are also those who take the public law
functions described above and suggest they apply best on a local scale;
they have said state common law allows tort jurisprudence to better achieve
social engineering through local experimentation.35 In its implication of
the law and culture nexus, this is a different kind of argument. Its common
law basis allows not that tort law will change to match the culture but
that tort law will be the instrument by which that culture is changed.
The objective of change is to match better the vicissitudes of a local
population set among the multitude of different local populations across
the United States. Both arguments, one that favors state common law as
more reflective of local culture and the other that favors it as a more
efficient laboratory for experimentation, are variants of legal pluralism—the
notion that different legal systems can coexist and correlate to serve
better the needs of an extant cultural pluralism.36 But is a closer fit
between law and local culture—even if possible—a worthy objective to
justify state law autonomy in torts? Are there moments when local
variation in law and culture are undesirable? And what should be the
criteria by which this will be determined?
Tension between the private and public law will remain, but selection
between these does not dispose of power distribution between states and
the federal government. Indeed, some have recently suggested that torts
operates as a hybrid system. In accordance with Calabresi’s theory, the
tort system has historically balanced both public and private law functions
from its inception, and the system’s health may depend upon maintenance

33. John C. Toro, Note, Why Principles of Federalism and Communitarianism
Demand that Tort Law Be Left Up to the States, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 674
(2009).
34. See id. at 676.
35. See Klass, supra note 15, at 1505.
36. William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 489 & n.53 (2010).
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of this duality.37 Even the newer civil recourse theory of Goldberg and
Zipursky—holding that torts is premised upon private access to the
public right to sue once someone has been injured—exhibits elements
of both.38 So, determination of whether to federalize or shield areas from
federalization should be made not on whether doing so better serves
private or public law but on the basis of whether liability for a particular
type of conduct is otherwise immunized by the vicissitudes of scale. In
settings where it is, federalization may be appropriate to overcome
limitations of the local. Under this contoured approach, to extend what
political scientist Morton Grodzins once famously called “marble
cake” federalism, tort law should be federalized in some substantive
areas of social and economic life although protected from federalization
in select others. 39 Once the federalism function is recognized, these
contours are properly the object of ongoing refinement by lower court
adjudicators nationwide. In short, the federalism function recognizes that
lower courts now bear considerable responsibility in refining the contours
of cooperative federalism. The remaining Parts of this Article offer modest
guidance to adjudicators faced with such choices.
III. THE SEVERAL FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
To say a core legal subsystem has essential functions is to enter a
thicket of competing interests and propositions. The most generalizable
goal of law as such is to regulate human behavior.40 From there, one
may begin to debate why that is a valid purpose, what the consequences
should be for defying it, or to what depth legal subjects must accept their
subservience to it. All such subsidiary discussion of law’s functions
must be disclaimed as highly contested, contingent propositions that
themselves serve those functions at the instant they describe them. For
this reason, the several accepted functions of tort law are also headings
for entire schools of thought, and the precise number or distinctions
between them are the subject of some uncertainty. For expediency, I
take the list of tort functions offered by Kenneth Abraham, which includes
corrective justice, optimal deterrence, loss distribution, compensation, and

37. See Guido Calabresi, Toward a Unified Theory of Torts, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2007).
38. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society,
64 MD. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (2005).
39. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (Daniel Elazar ed., Transaction Books 1984) (1960).
40. See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 18 (“In medieval England, the law of
torts, like the law of crimes, had modest aims, principally to discourage violence and
revenge. Today’s tort law has much grander aims.”).
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social justice.41 In this subpart, I briefly consider the unifying and
distinguishing features of these functions to enable assessment of whether
federalism itself merits addition to this list.
A. Corrective Justice
In part because tort derives from a Latin root meaning twisted, it is
unsurprising to find the first policy function of tort law listed as
corrective justice—the righting of wrongs on an intersubjective level.42
In several ways, other related characteristics of the tort law can be said
to serve the corrective justice function. Such characteristics include the
fault principle, whereby liability is not imposed without some determination
of wrongful conduct, or the imposition of strict liability based on
nonreciprocal risk creation.43 In the abstract, judgments framed to serve
the ideal of corrective justice appeal to an almost innate human value for
fairness and balance in the world. Nature aside, these are also deeply
rooted in social organization forms that predate modernity. There, law
palpably derived from the cultural norms that bound individuals, families,
and bands into communities.
Community standards might be embodied in an explicit custom . . . . Or they
might be embodied only in the views of the jury that decides the case. If the
jury is representative of the community as a whole, its verdict is likely to
reflect the implicit standards of fault and liability that already exist at that time
and that place. This, too, is a view of corrective justice.44

And yet, the corrective justice function, despite its ability to make
sense of the need for fault and nonreciprocity, is far from absolute.
Frequently, cases must be disposed of without wrongs being righted
because this policy aim is simply one of several.45 Moreover, there are

41. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 17–23 (3d
ed. 2007).
42. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 19–20 (“Tort law is at least partly rights-based.
That is, it is at least partly based on ideals of corrective justice, ideals of righting wrongs,
or (somewhat relatedly) ideals about accountability or personal responsibility for harmcausing conduct. Every claim is unique because it is about individual human beings, or
at least individual corporations acting in particular circumstances.”).
43. See id. at 24, 26.
44. Id. at 26.
45. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). In Sidis, a
“where are they now” article written profiling a former child prodigy who went to great
lengths to avoid the limelight was nonetheless not an invasion of privacy. Id. at 807,
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clear examples where community-based norms may have justified one
outcome but a court arrived at a different one in the name of—rather
than despite—corrective justice.46
B. Optimal Deterrence
Optimal deterrence is a second function combining two concepts.
First, deterrence may be most clear: tort rules seek to influence human
behavior away from socially deleterious conduct and toward conduct the
results of which are “socially useful.”47 Deterrence takes specific and
general forms, but with the shift toward a public law vision of torts, specific
deterrence—the kind seeking to prevent this defendant from committing
this harm again—is frequently left out.48 General deterrence, the goal of
influencing an entire industry or population, has meanwhile found
primacy as an effective, efficient form of social engineering the further
one ascends in the civil court hierarchy.49
At the same time, courts have recognized that deterrence without
precision is systematically negative. Thus, they balance an impulse to
discourage harmful conduct against a need to protect socially useful
conduct whose net impact on the society—usually judged in economic
terms—is positive.50 The appropriate deterrence required is found at the
balance between discouragement of risk and encouragement of utility.51
Such balancing is nowhere more visible than in nuisance. Under the
law of nuisance, courts require that the plaintiff’s harm be a “substantial
and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another’s
809. Although the court acknowledged that the article “[could] be fairly described as a
ruthless exposure of a once public character,” the court found for the defendant publisher
on account of the competing interest of newsworthiness. Id.
46. See, e.g., Grant v. Readers Digest Ass’n, Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 734–35 (2d Cir.
1945) (finding that a Massachusetts attorney could suffer reputational harm from being
described as an “agent” of the Communist Party despite the “wrong thinking” nature of
anti-Communist social fears); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1357 (Del. 1995)
(holding that an HIV-positive dentist who continued to treat unknowing patients was not
liable for battery because the patients’ fears of contracting the virus from mere presence
were not “reasonable”).
47. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental
Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 591–92 (2002).
Social utility is a pervasive and insufficiently examined concept in tort law, almost
always defined in generalized, economistic terms. It is italicized to signal the possibility
of more nuanced sociological and anthropological understandings of social use value.
48. See Klass, supra note 15, at 1573; Schroeder, supra note 47, at 590 n.24.
49. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that
industry-wide custom is relevant to but not dispositive of breach of a standard of care in
negligence liability).
50. See Klass, supra note 15, at 1571, 1573.
51. See id.
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property.”52 In requiring a determination of “unreasonableness,” courts
have developed a multifactor test incorporating six to eight variables to
consider.53 Courts employ those factors to determine whether the “gravity
of harm” outweighs the “utility of the conduct,” arguably making this
balancing act the nucleus of the cause of action.54 Interestingly, the onetime trump card of “coming to the nuisance” could have once easily
defeated any utility-balancing argument.55 Today, that defense has been
subsumed as another factor to consider alongside that balance, and
community norms can thus form some basis for adjudication or
alternatively be cast aside altogether.56
Finding expression patently in tort doctrines such as nuisance, optimal
deterrence helps to organize subsidiary concepts such as harm and utility
into one single notion by designating the sweet spot between these. It
also functions in many cases to alter community-based norms as in, for
example, the equivalency with coming to the nuisance. And finally, it
appears to coexist alongside other policy functions—to “play nicely”
with them as is apparently required for membership in the hallowed club
of tort functions. Nevertheless, optimal deterrence adds another dimension
in the form of balancing. It illustrates how appropriate balancing between
competing needs where those needs are of comparable weight becomes a
critical function of adjudication in torts.
C. Loss Distribution
Seemingly modern in its scalar vision of harm and justice, loss
distribution is the aim of spreading costs incurred by harms to one party
across a larger swath of population presumably in a better position to
absorb those costs on an individualized basis.57 A classic example is the
finding of strict products liability for corporate tortfeasors in situations

52. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 9 (2010).
53. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826–828 (1979).
54. See id.
55. See e.g., Oetjen v. Goff Kirby Co., 49 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
56. See, e.g., City of Lebanon v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. Civ. 02-6351-AA,
2004 WL 1078982, at *3 (D. Or. May 11, 2004) (“[E]ven assuming that defendants could
demonstrate . . . that the plaintiff knowingly ‘came to the nuisance,’ that fact, although
pertinent, would not be dispositive.”).
57. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961).
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when fault is lacking.58 Here, the corporate defendant may be asked to
compensate a plaintiff for the plaintiff’s losses on the presumption that
the corporation can internalize the burdens of such compensation through
product pricing.59 A second archetype is the “no fault” auto insurance
system in effect in some states today.60
There is an apparent modernity to this reasoning; considerations of
loss distribution predate modern products liability to the heyday of
industrial capitalism in North America. Lawrence Friedman writes of
early justifications for the “fellow servant” rule, which held that industrial
employees could not sue for harm from negligent conduct of fellow
employees at work,61 and the “charitable immunity” doctrine, which
prevented malpractice liability claims against nonprofit hospitals.62 In
each of these now unpopular doctrines, industrial-era courts were responding
to a “deep pocket” mentality among injured plaintiffs and their counsel.63
In that sense, courts were not ready to privilege distributive justice until
the point at which accidents became unbearably high in frequency and
industrial profits became concomitantly high in volume. This point is
illustrated by the coinciding erosion of fellow servant rules and explosion
in railroad accident deaths near the turn of the century.64
Today, loss distribution does much of what its co-functions do. It
helps reconcile utility and corrective justice by offering the chance for
redistribution of surplus capital on the basis of harms created in the
production of that surplus. It sits comfortably among the others and,
perhaps more than them, lingers in the background in most cases outside
of products liability and insurance contexts. And, it employs balancing
in the sense that it requires courts, particularly in the products field, to
limit loss spreading against the financial capacity for enterprise to absorb
and pass on such costs without destroying their business operation.65
58. See e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
59. James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products
Liability: A Case Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
443, 473–74 (1995).
60. Jeffrey O’Connell & David Partlett, An America’s Cup for Tort Reform?
Australia and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 443, 485 (1988)
(“[Automobile no-fault insurance] achieves loss distribution because it leaves fewer
accident victims and their families without resources.”); Susan Ladika, Is No-Fault
Insurance Finished?, MSN Money (Sept. 18, 2012, 6:13 PM), http://money.msn.com/
auto-insurance/is-no-fault-insurance-finished.
61. Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule,
1837-1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1984).
62. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 416 (1973).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 423.
65. See Calabresi, supra note 57, at 522.
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Finally, loss distribution engages in a form of social engineering to the
extent that it treats surplus capital almost as a symbol for a common
fund out of which to compensate victims of torts.66
But the real significance of this tort function may be its incorporation
of scale. This incorporation is best described as “modernist” in the sense
that it properly understands the plight of the individual in the age of
industrial capital as a transferrable object of corporate research, profiling,
marketing, and surplus production. Far from revolutionary, this
understanding is rather conciliatory; it offers corporate tortfeasors the
option to internalize costs and pass them on to voluntary participants,
rather than simply externalizing the costs of production onto the shoulders
of harmed consumers. That conciliation itself may be seen as adding
value through its public relations benefit. Further still, in recognizing
the struggle between individual and corporate existence—and the role of
sheer population sizes in the acceptance and rejection of moral citizenship
and its financial surrogacy—the embrace of loss distribution policy in
torts has greatly foreshadowed the federalism function.
D. Compensation and Social Justice
Victim compensation and social justice are more complicated points in
a discussion of the functions of tort law. On one hand, they appeal to ideals
of fairness and inclusivity. On the other, they do not often form the
primary basis for court reasoning toward dispute outcomes.67 In this
way they serve what some have considered “secondary” functions68: Their
achievement satisfies cultural demands about law even when that
achievement is not the stated basis for a decision.
66. This treatment is symbolic because under most conceptions, corporate wealth
is not itself the basis for compensation but rather a marker of a company’s health such
that it can more justifiably be asked to pass on the burden of its harm-inducing conduct
in the form of higher product and service prices at market.
67. ABRAHAM, supra note 41, at 18–19 (“The desirability of providing compensation
to a particular class of injury victims rarely explains the liens that are drawn to distinguish
those who are and those who are not entitled to prevail in a tort claim. Rather, time after
time, some other factor or factors explain the occasion for the imposition of tort liability
or tort law’s refusal to impose liability. As Holmes put it with characteristically ruthless
clarity over a century ago, ‘The general principle of our law is that loss from accident
must lie where it falls . . . .’” (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76–78
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881)).
68. See id. (“Rather, victims are provided compensation in order to serve the other
goals of tort law, such as corrective justice and deterrence.”).
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Limitations on the compensation function are best seen in cases of
“pure economic loss.” There, a defendant has caused harm to a plaintiff
amounting to no more than the loss of opportunity for financial gain or
security. A common example is the loss of business that befalls a storefront
on the far side of a bridge damaged and made impassable by the negligence
of a ship captain on the river below. In such cases, the general rule has
been to deny recovery under the “economic loss rule”—a common law
doctrine barring recovery in the absence of some physical damage to the
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property.69 Justification for this rule is twofold.
First, the scope of liability in economic loss cases becomes too large
given the speed and fluidity with which such loss spreads through an urban
business community. Second, courts prefer to reserve liability of defendants
for more tangible, verifiable personal injury and property damage given
the often limited capacity to absorb such liability. If compensation were
properly a primary function of the law, neither of these challenges would
prevent liability for a party harmed in the purely economic sense.
Likewise, social justice is sometimes, though perhaps less rarely, served
through tort litigation; when it is, such cases seem to meet a cultural
expectation that law occasionally restore power imbalances in our society
even apart from other functions. Commonly, due in part to the nature of
risk creation and the nature of attorney compensation systems, such cases
involve a “David versus Goliath” relationship where a relatively weak
plaintiff or class succeeds against a powerful corporate or institutional
entity. Such cases might include Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., in which
auto manufacturer Ford was held liable for choosing not to preemptively
repair its autos with defective fuel tanks after assessing that aggregate
settlement payouts would cost less than a recall.70 At the same time, such
cases have been the subject of considerable cultural backlash as seen in
the marquee “hot coffee” case Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S.,
Inc. and the attendant public reaction.71 The extent to which such backlash
is an organic or manufactured response may remain a separate question
for debate.
Tort law occasionally serves the functions of compensation and social
justice but does so usually to reinforce the other functions listed above.
For better or for worse, cases decided purely on “fairness” grounds in
these categories do not stand up to doctrinal scrutiny and therefore do
not form the basis for generalizable outcomes.

69. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308 (1927),
superseded by statute, Trans-America Pipeline Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (1973).
70. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360–61, 391 (Ct. App. 1981).
71. No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated,
1994 WL 16777704 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994); HOT COFFEE, supra note 21.
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E. Common Features or “Metafunctions”
Upon synthesizing key characteristics of the varying functions of tort
law, several themes emerge. First, all permit social engineering—the
act of defining norms not to reproduce a social structure but to reshape
one.72 One example might be the “AIDS cases” in battery that emerged
in the 1990s. A lead case, Brzoska v. Olson, involved a dentist who
continued to treat patients after learning of his infection with HIV and
then later died from AIDS.73 At the time the case arose in the late 1980s,
the public perceived the risk of HIV infection from mere contact to be
very high.74 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, refused to judge
risk through the eyes of the public and instead sought to endorse, and
thus publicize, medical expert health risk assessments.75 As it stated,
“[B]ecause HIV is transmitted only through fluid-to-fluid contact or
exposure, the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s fear of AIDS should be
measured by whether or not there was a channel of infection or actual
exposure of the plaintiff to the virus.”76
Under classic tort law, battery is an “act[] intending to cause a harmful
or offensive contact with the person of the other . . . and [where] harmful
contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”77 The
Brzoska facts may constitute a classic medical battery if the plaintiff
patients were either subjectively harmed or objectively offended. Given
that they were not independently harmed—their health was not made
worse—the case turns upon whether a consented touching becomes
unconsented and offensive when its circumstances involved greater
perceived or actual health risk than originally known.78
Brzoska might be interpreted in a few ways. As a case of optimal
deterrence, the case represents a court instructing the public on how it
should best assess health risks. For example, a judgment must be made
as to the utility of any conduct, and this is weighed against the risks
associated therewith. The goal is to deter as much risky behavior as
possible before doing so creates a net loss in value to the society.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1943).
668 A.2d 1355, 1357 (Del. 1995).
See id. at 1363.
See id.
Id. at 1362–63.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
See Brzoska, 668 A.2d at 1366.
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Ascription of utility and risk values, however, need not be premised
merely upon existing social attitudes, and in many cases, it is designed to
counter those attitudes by developing new priorities in valuation. As a
case of corrective justice, the opinion also represents courts departing
from community standards as to what constitutes an “offense.” Again,
the court decided that perceived health risk was insufficient and that
actual risk gauged by the medical community was controlling.79 More
importantly, it self-consciously adopted this position to influence public
rationality and the status of HIV patients more generally.
A second theme across the functions of tort law is the priority for
balancing interests. To see this in practice from multiple angles, one might
look to a classic nuisance case such as Carpenter v. Double R Cattle
Co.80 There, a plaintiff landowner brought a nuisance claim against an
adjacent cattle feedlot that housed thousands of animals and generated a
variety of harms. 81 Doctrinally, nuisance is the “substantial and
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another’s
property.”82 By all means, the infestation of Carpenter’s property by
noxious smells, swarms of bugs, and polluted wastewater from the adjacent
feedlot constituted an interference with Carpenter’s use and enjoyment
of his land. However, in determining the “unreasonableness” of this
interference, the court adopted a classic cost-benefit utility balancing
approach, asking whether the benefits created by the feedlot were exceeded
by the degree of harm it was creating.83 Again, this approach clearly
exhibits the optimal deterrence function lingering behind the property
tort of nuisance. On this basis, the court refused to impose any damage
penalty on the defendant, effectively saying that to do so would be to
“overdeter” net-beneficial conduct in a sparsely populated, agrarian state
such as Idaho.84
Not only was this choice the result of balancing utility and harm, as is
commonly seen in nuisance reasonableness jurisprudence, but it also
reflected two other less-explicit forms of balancing. First, it showed the
court balancing tradition with modernity. In Carpenter, the industrial
agriculture of Idaho is presented as the modern basis of that state’s
subsistence pitted against the traditional individual right to be undisturbed
on one’s homestead. Second, it reflects the balancing of nuisance’s private
and public law priorities. The choice to allow Double R to continue its

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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See id. at 1363.
701 P.2d 222 (Idaho 1985).
Id. at 224.
66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 9 (2010).
Carpenter, 701 P.2d at 227.
Id. at 228.
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operations unchecked was a choice to emphasize community subsistence
over and above the need to compensate an individual for his lost use and
enjoyment. Conceivably, on different facts such as greater population
density or greater toxicity in the industrial discharge, the case would
have come out in favor of Carpenter on each of the above balances. The
case thus illustrates well the prevalence of balancing in general to what
are commonly referred to as tort law’s functions.
Finally, Carpenter might be viewed in terms of loss distribution as
again illustrating the propensity for interest balancing in the tort law’s
main functions. Under simple loss distribution, the court is to weigh the
capacity for one party’s ability to absorb the costs of harm against the
other party’s capacity to do so. Under normal conditions in modern, urban
environments, this calculus favors individual plaintiffs when institutions,
governments, or corporate entities harm them, on the premise that costs of
damage awards can be passed on to taxpayers or consumers. However,
when such an entity is the only one of its kind, or the sole basis for
community subsistence in an isolated area, and where it is unable to pass
on such costs without failure, loss distribution dictates that the costs of
harm should be borne by the plaintiff.
If social engineering and interest balancing are two common themes
across these functions, efficiency is a third. This may take the form of
either economic or judicial efficiency. Optimal deterrence and loss
distribution say that behavior should be regulated, and costs of injury
spread, only to the extent that doing so does not create a net economic
burden to a society. Likewise, corrective, compensatory, and social justice
all work toward minimizing the flow of litigation into courtrooms by
requiring suits to be premised upon legitimate “wrongs.” In early cases
involving “social host” liability, for instance, courts grappled with assessing
the legitimacy of claims against party hosts who serve alcohol to minors
who then injure or kill third parties while driving home.85 There, some
judges felt extension of liability would open “floodgates to litigation”
given the frequency of such conduct and the thirst for compensatory
damages on the part of families and their counsel. The Supreme Court
of Illinois elaborated on the fear of increased litigation:

85.

See, e.g., Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 155 (Ill. 1995).
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We are realistic enough to know that in virtually every instance where an
underage driver is involved in an alcohol-related car accident, a clever plaintiff’s
attorney would drag into court any and all adults who may qualify as a social
host. The focus at trial would then shift from the drunk driver to the alleged
social hosts.86

Such statements reflect a traditional view of culpability emphasizing
individual responsibility and control and the consequent use of this
conception of culpability to curb the flow of social host suits into court.87
Later cases deviating from this tradition did so with the requirement that
liability be found only when the plaintiff is a third party and not the
drunk driver.88
Combined, the so-called functions of tort law have common
characteristics that include social engineering, balancing, and efficiency
considerations. If these functions are to be understood as policy goals,
then the common features of those goals—or metafunctions—all appear
to allow reshaping the social field by weighing disparate competing interests
and resetting their balance to make more efficient use of resources.
What, then, is federalism, and can it serve these goals?
IV. FEDERALISM DEFINED: POWER ALLOCATION AND SCALE
Generally understood, federalism is an arrangement of governance
where sovereign authority is shared between central and local geopolitical
units.89 In the United States, the Federal Constitution sets limits for tort
law so that where federal legislation is absent, state law has been heavily
modified where it conflicts with federal constitutional rights.90 The
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that state law will be preempted
in areas where federal law has either already acted or reserved the area
for its own competence.91 This arrangement can be understood differentially
in political, legal, and cultural terms. Politically, it requires leadership
and institutions at both levels of authority with clear delineation of the
roles and competencies served by each. In legal terms, federalism requires
harmonization of rules and processes between both levels, and such
harmonization usually entails designation of supremacy to the federal
government in case of disagreements or uncertainties. And culturally,

86. Id. at 164.
87. See DAVID M. ENGEL, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal
Injuries in an American Community, in LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN
TOWNS 27, 32–33 (Carol J. Greenhouse et al. eds., 1994).
88. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984).
89. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).
90. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 39.
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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federalism is the process of balancing regional or local values and symbols
against national ones.
Political contours of American federalism are most apparent. Each
state is governed by analogous tripartite branches of executive, judicial,
and legislative authority although details and nomenclature within each
may differ.92 And administrative departments are often also analogous
in shape and function so that, for example, California has its own statelevel Environmental Protection Agency tasked with enforcing that state’s
own regulations in a manner largely similar to the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency.93 Demand for such political institutions is largely
secured by the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, which states in relevant
part that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”94 Thus, each state retains in theory
significant political autonomy and must function as a sovereign over
numerous aspects—highway safety for instance—of people’s everyday
life.95 In this regard, with a view only to institutions and leadership, the
political dimensions of American federalism appear to leave considerable
power in the hands of each state.
Behind institutions and leadership sits the legal authority through
which they operate and regulate behavior. The proper legal dimensions
of federalism afford less local autonomy than the distribution of political
power that flows from them. In addition to the Tenth Amendment’s
reservation clause, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides
enumerated powers for federal authorities. These include the power to
collect taxes, borrow on credit, regulate transnational and interstate
commerce, establish naturalization rules, establish bankruptcy rules, coin
money and punish counterfeiting, establish post offices, protect copyrights,
establish federal tribunals, punish crimes on the high seas, declare war,
raise an army, provide a navy, develop military governance, call upon
the military to maintain the Union, arm and discipline the military,
92. State and Local Government, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ourgovernment/state-and-local-government (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
93. See CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/ (last updated
Mar. 20, 2014); Laws and Executive Orders, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last updated Mar. 16, 2014).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
95. See Amy Lehman, Briefly Noted, Dormant Commerce Clause Revisited:
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 388, 388 (1981) (quoting
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959)).
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legislate for the District of Columbia and other federal properties, as well
as pass any laws “necessary and proper” for the execution of the above
tasks.96 In the eyes of many, the Necessary and Proper Clause can provide
the empowering authority for most federal legislative efforts, particularly
when paired with the Interstate Commerce Clause.97 That reading,
however, has been disfavored in Supreme Court jurisprudence since United
States v. Lopez, in which a federal statute barring guns from school areas
was struck down as exceeding the scope of federal commerce power.98
This principle was reaffirmed in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, where the Roberts Court again reinforced limitation
on federal commerce power in the domain of health insurance despite
finding federal authority under the taxation clause. 99 Outside the
enumerated powers of Article I, federal authority has been extended by
constitutional amendments.100
Finally, underlying the political and legal worlds of federalism sits a
cultural dimension that acts in mutual feedback with these other levels.
If political institutions and leadership are shared between state and
federal levels and if legal authority is granted to federal and state bodies
on different matters of competence, then these follow from an implicit
agreement that cultural matters are also best divided between state and
federal levels of governance. Culture, here, includes all symbols, practices,
and belief systems of a society. As it relates to politics and law, culture
is the extra-legal array of norms and customs that underpin legal authority
and the efficiency by which it regulates a population.101 Language, for
instance, is one such custom; although it need not be universal, its
predominance may be requisite to the widespread understanding and
agreement of legal norms. Religion is a second example; the predominance
of individual religious communities in certain states of the Union—
Mormons in Utah for example—has differentially shaped legal rules in
those states where complete national uniformity in the form of federal
law might prove untenable or inefficient.102 Freedom of religion,
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
97. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 616–19 (discussing the expansion of federal power in
pre-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its interdependence with the Necessary
and Proper Clause).
98. See 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
99. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587, 2594, 2600 (2012).
100. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
101. See Ilhyung Lee, In re Culture: The Cross-Cultural Negotiations Course in
the Law School Curriculum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 375, 410 (2005).
102. See, e.g., Dawn House, State Defends Mormon Church Influencing Utah Liquor
Laws, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/
53341059-79/state-liquor-utah-laws.html.csp (examining the purported influence of the
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meanwhile, is sufficiently general and fundamental as to justify federal
protection. Though the manner in which cultural domains are divided
among state and federal authorities may be interpreted differently, the
fact of such division can hardly be disputed.
For those who believe federalization is intrinsically a bad thing, tort
law has traditionally been comprised of common law rules hailing from
customary norms that emerge from community life and social
organization.103 Such arguments fetishize community and misread the
manner in which federalism already deals with culture. This use of
community is problematic for several reasons. First, it taps into nationalist
narratives in which a large population of individuals separated by great
distances and ideological positions must imagine themselves as descendants
of a common folk past.104 As many have pointed out, this imagination of
common roots has formed the basis for fascist political projects and mass
xenophobia—particularly in Europe where ethnic diversity is abundant and
geopolitical territory scarce.105 Second, it ignores the great diversity
extant and emergent in American cities and towns across the nation.
Resistance to such diversity was precisely one undercurrent of the “states’
rights” movement that opposed civil rights in the 1950s.106 Even
discounting that past, the present ethnoracial diversity of the American
landscape does not support resistance to tort federalization in the name
of unitary community. This is not to suggest uniformity at the level of
federal law is preferable but rather that the choice whether or not to
federalize an area such as tort law should not be made based upon a
mythically common community when its existence is increasingly
aspirational rather than empirical.

Mormon Church on the Utah State Legislature in the ban of happy hours, among other
liquor-related legislation).
103. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 957 (1989) (examining the
influence of changing norms on the evolution of the right to privacy).
104. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 1, 1–5 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
105. See ROBERT O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 32–42 (2004).
106. See Thelton Henderson, Justice, U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist. of Cal., Social
Change, Judicial Activism, and the Public Interest Lawyer, in 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
33, 39 (2003).
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Finding the suitable balance between state and national cultural
uniformity is a key purpose of federalism.107 Scholars who argue against
federalization in the name of community perhaps misread the concept to
necessarily imply full federal incursion into state competency based
upon fears of a slippery slope of federal intervention. These fears are
unjustified at the very least because national governments cannot
generally—particularly in the United States example—easily govern
vastly separated and diverse populations. They rely upon states for
collaboration in this effort and must therefore leave in local governments
a substantial degree of sovereignty.
Viewed in this light, federalism appears to match the metafunctions of
tort law that characterize recognized functions such as optimal deterrence
and loss distribution. First, it enables large-scale social engineering—
the refinement of a social order in ways that exceed current realities.
Indeed, the civil rights example offers ideal illustration of the way
federalism allowed genesis of a new social order likely impossible
under unchecked states’ rights. Had the Supreme Court chosen to favor
community in that example, the nation as a whole might have retained a
racially segregated urban landscape for years to come. Although the states
have been described as ideal “laboratories” for social experimentation in
the area of tort law,108 this observation reminds us that the state is not the
exclusive geopolitical unit on which such experimentation is possible or
desirable.
Second, like other functions, federalism also entails critical balancing
of key social and legal interests. At the most general, this takes the form
of power balancing.109 Concentrated too far in the hands of states, political
authority over citizens might encourage some states to discriminate
against citizens of other states and recent migrants.110 Concentrated too
far in the hands of national government, such authority might privilege
interests at the seat of power and disfavor marginal territories or political
minorities.111 The balance between levels affords protection of individual
rights against local interests, as well as protection of local interests
against burial under national priorities and projects.
Finally, federalism may be construed as an ongoing quest for efficiency.
Many would disagree with this claim by pointing to government
107. See Glenn S. Koppel, The Fruits of Shady Grove: Seeing the Forest for the
Trees, 44 AKRON L. REV. 999, 1000–01 (2011).
108. Klass, supra note 15, at 1507, 1510.
109. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REV. 93, 94 &
n.1 (2004).
110. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (requiring that each state extend to all
persons the privileges and immunities of citizenship afforded in other states).
111. See Lipkin, supra note 109, at 113–14.
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expenditures of tax revenue. But the operations of government and the
arrangement that leads to its authority are two separate matters. And
again, in certain areas of competence such as overseas military operations or
foreign trade, the national government is usually able to act far more
effectively. Likewise, the maintenance of city streets or building codes
and inspection practices are likely more effective when performed by local
policy experts and technicians. Though it may often get such competence
allocations wrong, federalism, here, is the ongoing effort to refine them.
As a process concerned with the distribution of political, legal, and
cultural authority between local and national levels of governance,
federalism exhibits several of the qualities associated with existing functions
of tort law. Cursory review of those functions—corrective justice, optimal
deterrence, loss distribution, and to some extent compensatory and
social justice—reveals common characteristics shared among them.
These characteristics include the capacity for social engineering, interest
balancing, and pursuit of resource efficiency. These characteristics, or
metafunctions, all seem to be served on some level by federalism.
But, as more than a concept, federalism looms large over state common
law with the capacity to retool existing doctrine and formulate new rights
and liabilities. It changes jurisprudence in matters historically rooted in
medieval England or Roman city-states, alters the strategies and tactics
of legal advocacy, and redefines social expectations of law in culture.
Part V below is a survey of the diverse areas in which the federalization of
tort law has already taken place and a modest evaluation of the results
such developments have brought.
V. CURRENT PATTERNS OF FEDERAL INCURSION INTO
STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS
Notwithstanding the torts-as-state-common-law formulation described
above, federal authority has reshaped tort doctrine in a number of readily
identifiable ways. Each of these has had a concomitant impact upon
legal culture—the symbols and practices employed by adjudicators, legal
professionals, and laypeople involved in the following types of cases.
The first may be grouped around constitutional rights implicated through
the tort system. These include, among other things, First Amendment
protection of free expression and its implication in tort actions, including
defamation or false light. The second type can be grouped as federal
preemption cases—claims arising under common law tort theory, most
often negligence or products liability, but preempted by federal legislative

105

act that supersedes state claims under the Supremacy Clause.112 Preemption
cases of this kind range widely in subject matter from transportation to
medical devices to environmental harms. The current Part presents each
of these areas, describing legal claims and arguments comprising each
with particular interest in any common pattern to make sense of current
contours of tort federalization.
A. Constitutional Rights
Civil liability in certain areas of tort law risk violation of a defendant’s
key constitutional rights. Where this has been the case, state court
jurisprudence has been modified by constitutional requirements to safeguard
those rights. Although the relative accuracy rate of post-federalization
rulings in this area remains a critical area of further investigation, this
subpart presents only the main areas where fundamental rights have
justified federal incursion.
1. The First Amendment: Defamation, Privacy, and
Emotional Distress
Liability for reputational and dignitary harms to the person is the
clearest area in which state law doctrines have become federalized.
Here, state rules have been modified by additional language meant to
ensure First Amendment protection for speech.113 Common law rules
were not entirely supplanted, but the influence of federal law beginning
in 1964 marked a tidal shift in tort jurisprudence wherein state court
judges were asked to apply a constitutional test to ensure protection of a
plaintiff’s reputation or privacy did not also constrain or chill valued
speech.114 Through this balancing approach, harmful speech in this area
of constitutional law is considered “less protected” speech.115 To
understand why the First Amendment suddenly required changes to
reputational and dignitary tort theories in the early 1960s, it is useful to
take a historical approach by looking first at what the common law
theories required for both a prima facie case and privileges and then
looking at what the new rulings added or subtracted from those. Most
importantly, it will be useful to note the ambient cultural context in
which such rulings arose, for therein lies the first key to assessing the
propriety of tort federalization.
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
113. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
114. See id.
115. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
1046 (3d ed. 2006).
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Under modern rules, tort liability for speech-related conduct that
damages a public figure plaintiff’s reputation requires application of the
“actual malice” standard.116 This test requires that the defendant have
harmed the plaintiff through the utterance of a statement that is
demonstrably false and that the utterance have been made with knowledge
of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement.117 Actual malice
has been held to apply as a safeguard against chilling effects on truthful
speech—particularly of the kind involving political or public matters on
which free exchange of ideas would be most desirable.118 The test was
first articulated by Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in the seminal
defamation case New York Times v. Sullivan,119 but it was later applied
in speech cases brought under theories of false light, public disclosure,
and emotional distress.120
The federalization of defamation through the actual malice standard is
a fascinating development. It captures succinctly what is probably at
stake in all areas of federal incursion: the proper balance between cultural
uniformity and cultural alterity where alterity is manifested in the
normative differences between discrete jurisdictional units or between
the present and the past. Defamation protects the plaintiff’s reputation
from false assertions of fact, however the value of reputation may itself
have changed over time since the theory’s development under British
common law.121 Provisionally adopting the evolutionist view of law and
society, modern law is marked by move from “status to contract” where
social relations depend less upon an individual’s social position and more
upon the individual’s bargained for, legally cognizable relationships.122
Early protection of individual reputation under British common law
might be read as a holdover from this premodern stage of sociolegal

116. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1178 (discussing the “Times-Sullivan” rule).
117. Id.
118. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
487, 532–33 (1991). The desirability of free speech on matters of political or public
concern is a premise originating with the Constitution’s Framers in response to their
specific cultural condition under British rule. See CLYDE AUGUSTUS DUNIWAY, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS 123 (1906). It should not
be taken for granted as a “universal” in either the spatial or temporal sense.
119. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
120. See infra notes 144–58 and accompanying text.
121. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
122. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 140–41 (1986).
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evolution. Indeed, the common law cause of action for libel or slander
permitted “presumed” damages for certain types of utterances without
proof of actual harm because, it was thought, certain verbal assaults
necessarily damaged one’s reputation.123
The common law claim for libel or slander required basic elements that
are still necessary today. The plaintiff must have shown that a defendant
made a “defamatory statement”—tending to cause harm to one’s reputation
in a community—that was sufficiently “concerning” the plaintiff rather
than vague or objectless and that this statement was “publi[shed]” or
communicated to at least one other person.124 Under this basic prima
facie case, the cultural situation of the plaintiff could be narrowly drawn
and figured prominently. First, the element of defamatoriness was
relatively subjective: it could be damaging in the eyes of a tangible
community, for example, a village; a vocational community, for example,
shoemakers; or a spiritual community, for example, Orthodox Jews. Under
modern rules, this narrowness is captured in the doctrinal recognition of
“substantial and respectable minority” opinion to establish defamatoriness.125
Similarly, the “concerning” requirement asked that the plaintiff show
cognizable membership in a group in cases where the plaintiff was not
mentioned by name but defamed by association with a named group.126
These elements of the common law claim invoked a high degree of cultural
specificity. Such specificity may have been appropriate under early
modern conditions where community stood for something concrete, where
social relations rarely crossed large geographic spaces, and where political
interests tended to remain local for practical and economic reasons.
But, a difficulty arose as these simple conditions evolved into more complex
social realities. How, in short, could local norms as to reputational harm
be applied to speech-uttering defendants operating at distances remote from
the cultural milieux in which the above assessments were always made?
A litany of conditional and absolute privileges available as defenses to
the common law case were already applied to this problem. The conditional
privileges were those that could be raised to defeat a complete prima
facie case in the absence of scienter or malice on the part of the defendant.

123. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
124. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (modern definition of
defamation); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971) (common law
definition of defamation).
125. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977). Although
perceptions of a community of Orthodox Jews has been held sufficiently significant to
establish that a statement was “defamatory,” Braun v. Armour & Co., 173 N.E. 845, 845
(N.Y. 1930), perceptions of a prison inmate community have been held to be the
opposite, Saunders v. Bd. of Dirs., WHYY-TV, 382 A.2d 257, 259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
126. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977).
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So long as a damaging false statement was made without intent to harm
the plaintiff, the defendant could be absolved of liability for reputational
harm that resulted. Absolute privileges were those that could shield liability
even for such statements made with ill intent. Among these privileges,
two major themes that would have pertained to New York Times were
news media and political status. Under the “fair report” privilege, for
instance, reporting on truthful proceedings or documentation from public
sources was shielded from liability even when false and reputationally
damaging.127 Under the judicial proceedings and legislative acts privileges,
judges and elected representatives were shielded from false and
reputationally damaging statements made in the course of their related
business.128 Although these are only a few examples of the many privileges
applied under the common law in defamation cases, they begin to raise the
question why a federal standard was necessary to counterbalance tort
protection for reputation with constitutional guarantees on free speech.
That federal standard, the actual malice test, emerged in a case of
unique historical and political significance. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
saw a claim from an Alabama police chief against a nationally circulating
print media outlet for statements it published regarding his treatment of
civil rights demonstrators.129 The demonstrations were symptomatic of
widespread racial tensions around the country and targeted local attitudes on
race and law enforcement practices specific to the Deep South.130 From
the defendant’s perspective, Alabama local community practices regarding
race were backwards and justified not only the public unrest described in
the New York Times but also the defendant’s self-assessment of the
propriety of its reporting on that unrest.131 New York, not Alabama, in
short, was to provide the cultural basis for judgments on reputational harm
to segregationists or repressive police practices. From the plaintiff’s
perspective, the urban, northern news media did not comprehend local
attitudes on difference and tradition. More importantly, the New York

127. E.g., Hudak v. Times Publ’g Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(citing Sciandra v. Lynett, 187 A.2d 586, 588–89 (Pa. 1963)).
128. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969) (legislative acts
privilege); 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977) (judicial proceedings privilege).
129. 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
130. See id. at 256–58.
131. See id. at 256–57, 260–62.
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Times article was factually inaccurate and painted a single local police
chief as an enemy of progress.132
This opposition, exaggerated here for clarity, implicated two major
facets of cultural change in the early 1960s period: civil rights activism
and growing news media hegemony. Elsewhere under U.S. constitutional
law, the Supreme Court supported the civil rights movement by rendering
invalid de jure racial segregation.133 Discounting the widely supported
“states’ rights” rhetoric used to justify local autonomy in the area of civil
rights, the federal judiciary decided in effect that the states had to be
brought into conformity with national, for example, urban or metropolitan,
attitudes on race.134 In this move, the Court further converted race from a
purely cultural issue into a legal one.
Similarly, the application of federal authority to tort law in defamation
using the underlying civil rights fact pattern of New York Times was no
coincidence. As many have pointed out since, the purpose of the actual
malice standard was not to protect harmful but easily proven true
statements, nor harmful but unverifiably false statements; the former could
survive a common law claim with truth as an absolute defense, while the
latter was not worthy of protection a priori.135 Nor was the goal to
discourage harmful but easily proven false statements; these statements
were already deterred under the common law. Rather, the main object of
the actual malice standard and new burdens was to protect harmful but
unverifiably true statements—exactly those utterances that would be
valuable in public criticism of segregationist or other culturally
obstructionist public officials.
The emergence of tort federalization in a news media case is also
unsurprising given the twentieth-century emergence of nations as
“imagined” or “represented” communities.136 The advent of modern
nation-states occurred in a period when population size, urban living,
and social complexity combined to prevent individual members of modern
societies—subjects of the new statehood—from ever knowing most
members of their general community.137 Accordingly, nationhood
emerged to bind these members together through shared symbols and
practices across vast expanses of space, climate, and erstwhile cultural
132. Id. at 258.
133. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
134. See id.; Patrick M. Garry, Federalism’s Battle with History: The Inaccurate
Associations with Unpopular Politics, 74 UMKC L. REV. 365, 378 (2005).
135. Cf. Anderson, supra note 118, at 521–22, 524.
136. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 6 (discussing the problematic notion of
community in the modern world); JOHN D. KELLY & MARTHA KAPLAN, REPRESENTED
COMMUNITIES: FIJI AND WORLD DECOLONIZATION 4 (2001).
137. See supra notes 31–32, 103–05 and accompanying text.
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differences. Reaching across these distances, the new “print capitalism”
of newspapers and trade books permitted ideas and images to circulate
more widely, freely, and quickly than they ever had before. Knowledge
disparities that may have once characterized early modern American
society—as between working and propertied classes—were reduced. More
importantly, the common circulation of ideas and imagery participated in
the creation of a “uniform” American nation.
That uniformity was deeply contingent upon circumscription of insider
and outsider units. The U.S. civil rights movement, with which New
York Times was concerned at a metalevel, was about this circumscription.
Its participants sought both symbolic and materialist inclusion of
African-Americans through equal application of existing law and new
federal legislation. Social exclusion of nonwhites prior to Brown v. Board
of Education strengthened claims about cultural uniformity across the
American landscape. Despite observable linguistic and religious differences
among the many white immigrants who arrived on American shores since
the Revolution, a mainstream white population existed largely in direct
contradistinction to the “black”—and “brown”—populations excluded
under segregation. Even if segregation only directly impacted southern
states, its survival permitted symbolic differentiation in both northern and
southern regions regardless of local rules. This contradistinction required
maintenance of black outsiders in order to perennially construct and
maintain a uniform white insider status. On this account, federalization of
norms was not necessary to bring about uniformity.
As the nation warmed to the objectives of the civil rights movement,
insiders became less uniform in two respects. First, they now included
white as well as nonwhite communities. Second, the white population
was divided over the cultural primacy of segregation.138 In such a
context, federalization became necessary to restore uniformity across the
now larger insider national population.139 Such federalization took different
forms. The first and most proximate, discussed further below, came in
the form of federal preemption via legislation at the national level.140
The second was that of constitutional protection for fundamental rights.
In the latter category, the actual malice standard emerged to significantly
138. See, e.g., Herbert H. Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley, Attitudes Toward Desegregation,
211 SCI. AM. 16 (1964).
139. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 41, at 254–59 (supporting the idea that antiracist
nation building may have been the partial impetus behind the decision in N.Y. Times).
140. See infra Part V.B.
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modify tort liability for reputational harms in cases where freedom of
speech could be chilled by the threat of a common law defamation suit.141
Protection of free speech in this fashion almost explicitly served the
uniformity function of federalization in common law. In New York
Times, Justice Brennan was clearly interested in uniformity as the terminus
of social change on the subject of civil rights.
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The
constitutional safeguard, we have said, “was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.” “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.” “It is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,” and this
opportunity is to be afforded for “vigorous advocacy” no less than “abstract
discussion.” The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, “presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.”142

Applied to the facts of that case, this reasoning suggested that the New
York Times should not be liable for making assertions of fact that are
damaging and false but not known to be false or consciously disregarded
as such when reporting on a police official.143 Such freedom from liability
best guarantees that true statements regarding such an official will be
protected and says that the information contained in such statements is
of especially high value to the social change taking place at different
rates around the country at that time. Here, information is in the service
of change, change is in the service of uniformity, and uniformity is in the
service of—at least one vision of—equality.
Although not every defamation case is about underlying race relations,
subsequent extension of the new standard appeared frequently to pivot
on fact patterns arising amid rapid social change. First, the standard was
extended from defamation analysis into the invasion of privacy torts—
notably false light. At common law, the false light claim created liability
for a defendant who “gives publicity to a matter concerning another that

141. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
142. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964) (citations omitted)
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
143. See id. at 287–88.
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places the other before the public in a false light . . . if . . . the false light
in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”144 At face value, the theory is most distinct from defamation
insofar as harm is to the dignity—right to be seen as oneself—rather than
the reputation of the plaintiff and insofar as the “publicity” required
under the theory had to be more substantial than the mere third person
required in defamation. Furthermore, the claim is available even where
the information publicized is “technically true” but implies clearly an
objectionable false light; a classic example of this is the apolitical individual
photographed walking in front of a political rally whose photo is later
used in print to illustrate that individual’s attendance at the rally.
This common law rule was then supplemented by the actual malice
requirement. In the seminal case Time, Inc. v. Hill, a private figure plaintiff
sued another news media defendant for publishing photos of a reenactment
of a hostage crisis in which the plaintiffs had been the victims.145 The
photos suggested that the Hill family had been brutalized by their captors,
although the true story included far less physical conflict than that which
was depicted.146 The Court concluded that a false light claim in such
media defendant cases would require actual malice.147 Although the Court
concluded the additional test could have been met at the time, it is uncertain
today whether it would be on the same facts given the nonpublic figure
status of the plaintiffs.148 Nevertheless, requirement of the actual malice
standard in privacy cases involving the creation of a false light by media
defendants is still necessary and serves an informational uniformity
function similar to that found in the defamation cases.
A second privacy tort federalized under New York Times was public
disclosure of private facts. Designed like other privacy theories to protect a
dignitary interest in one’s solitude, the public disclosure tort is intimately
and inversely related to another party’s right to express oneself in the
public sphere.149 Hence, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn decided in 1978
that such expression was constitutionally protected when it conveyed

144. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
145. 385 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1967).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 390.
148. See id. at 393–94.
149. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); John A. Jurata, Jr.,
Comment, The Tort that Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure
of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 498, 544 (1999).
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facts that were already public record.150 There, a broadcast news reporter
included in one story the name of a Georgia rape victim not previously
identified in the press.151 The young woman’s name had been obtained
lawfully from an indictment in circulation in the courtroom during the
suspect’s hearing.152 A Georgia statute had previously deemed such a
victim’s name not to be a matter of public concern; however, this
provision was overturned on the basis of First and Fourteenth Amendment
protections on free speech.153
The extension of actual malice moved beyond reputation and privacy
to reach a third theory of liability: emotional distress. For emotional
harm caused by an intentional act of human expression—intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED)—the Supreme Court held in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell that public figures must show the statement was
made with actual malice.154 There, Hustler Magazine published a parodic
advertisement for a veritable liquor brand featuring a fake “testimonial” by
the Reverend Jerry Falwell describing an incestuous act with the latter’s
own mother.155 Hustler itself was a media defendant while Falwell was a
“public figure” under standard New York Times jurisprudence.156 The
unanimous Court suggested that to permit public figure recovery for
IIED without modification would allow public figure plaintiffs to make a
prima facie case for liability on the very same conduct that, under
defamation, would require actual malice.157 Further, because the standard
New York Times test must be met to “convincing clarity” rather than the
usual civil burden of “more likely than not,” IIED in its unmodified form
provided a significant “end run” around the speech protections created in
New York Times.158
The lead cases introducing and extending actual malice to defamation,
false light, public disclosure, and IIED exhibit several common
characteristics. The most obvious is that they seek legal recourse for
harmful acts of expression that were committed by media defendants.
Furthermore, the questionable utterance in each pertains to one or another
socially unacceptable behavior: racism, kidnapping, rape, and incest. These
common threads are no coincidence: the actual malice requirement is
intended to protect harmful but unverifiably true statements about public
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
Id. at 471–74.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 471–72, 496.
485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
See id. at 48.
See id. at 47, 57.
See id. at 47, 52–53.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 285–86 (1964).
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figures or matters of public concern.159 The risk of liability for such
statements will be justifiable to news media only when those statements
are of heightened public interest. Thus, in most cases where actual malice
applies, the subject matter will be a socially controversial one.
But the question is why nationwide uniformity, wrought by federalization
through First Amendment jurisprudence, is acceptable in this domain.
The answer is culture based. Americans over the twentieth century came to
view themselves as part of a national “public sphere”—a forum for the
exchange of ideas and information on matters of society, politics, and
economy.160 As described supra, genesis of this public sphere was
necessary for the development of modern nationhood.161 But, for purposes
of understanding federalism, it is not the emergence of a nationwide
public sphere that matters most but the regulation of it through application
of norms necessarily national in scope. In other words, public debates about
“Americanness” itself in the latter twentieth century made federalization
of tort in defamation, privacy, and emotional distress more acceptable, if
not desirable.
Today, little has changed except that perhaps an expansion of this
collective reflection on self-identity now includes notions of belonging
that far transcend our national borders. No better example exists than
the concept of human rights—a distinctly twenty-first century term that
seems to suggest universalism but is often used for clear differentiation
and distancing between “us and them,” “self and other.”162 In response
to this globalization of self-identity,163 should legal norms governing
expression also be globalized? One relatively recent illustration of this
open issue was the publication of cartoons by newspapers in Europe.
That episode, in which Muslims across Europe and beyond protested
graphical depiction of the Islamic prophet out of religious conviction,
caused many to question whether “First Amendment” rights were to be
subordinated out of fears of terrorism.164 In this climate, grassroots
159. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
160. See Blandine Chelini-Pont, Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and
Opportunities, 2005 BYU L. REV. 611, 614.
161. See supra notes 103–04.
162. See, e.g., ROBERT MEISTER, AFTER EVIL: A POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2011).
163. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND
SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991) (discussing “[t]he question of modernity” in
terms of “globalising influences on the one hand and personal dispositions on the other”).
164. Gene Policinski, Riots over Muhammad Cartoons Challenge Freedoms, FIRST
AMEND. CENTER (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/riots-over-muhammad

115

religious leaders took the initiative to publically burn Qurans in apparent
reaffirmation of the American constitutional right to do so.165 That the
debate mobilized legalistic, constitutional discourse is most significant,
particularly as doing so displaced simpler discussions about basic respect
and humility in the face of other people’s values.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment: Public Takings and Damage Awards
Outside reputational and dignitary harms, state tort law has received
narrow federal influence by constitutional authority in harms to property.
Here, traditional harms to property remain defined through state common
law jurisprudence. But, in a rare set of cases involving government
destruction or impairment of private property, courts have sometimes
held law enforcement and emergency relief agencies liable for violation
of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which extends to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Under the takings clause, federal
and state authorities have the power of eminent domain—the ability to
take private property for public use—provided that they offer “just
compensation” in exchange.167 Constitutional in appearance, this doctrine is
at bottom perhaps a contractual one: it permits a forced sale of property
where the first mover is the state and the aim of the transaction is some
form of public benefit.168
The question, then, in a number of tort fact patterns, is when such action
constitutes a “taking.” For a private actor, liability for impairment of
another’s property attaches under the theories of trespass to chattels or
conversion. Trespass to chattels is “intentionally . . . dispossessing another
of the chattel, or . . . using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession
of another.”169 Conversion, meanwhile, is an “intentional exercise of
dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the
right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay
the other the full value of the chattel.”170 In lay terms, a conversion is a
more complete or more egregious trespass. Technically, conversion is a
tort against an ownership interest while trespass is a tort against the

-cartoons-challenge-freedoms; Nicholas Watt, Danish Paper Sorry for Muhammad Cartoons,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2006), http://theguardian.com/media/2006/jan/31/religion.saudiarabia.
165. Dan Murphy, Why the Planned Koran Burning Causes Outrage and Alarm,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/GlobalNews/2010/0908/Why-the-planned-Koran-burning-causes-outrage-and-alarm.
166. See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1992).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
169. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
170. Id. § 222A.
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property integrity itself. In either case, a private individual is subject to
liability for conduct that satisfies the above tests.
Such conduct, of course, is defensible under the doctrines of public
and private necessity. Private necessity is an incomplete privilege that
avoids liability but requires payment of damages on the theory that the
trespass or conversion benefitted a single or narrow group of
beneficiaries.171 Destruction of the plaintiff’s property, in short, helped
get them—but only them—out of harm’s way. The common illustration is
the stranded hiker who breaks into a wooded cabin to take shelter from a
snowstorm. The hiker’s trespass—both to the real and personal property—
will be privileged, but he is still required to compensate the plaintiff.
Public necessity, meanwhile, is a complete privilege and entitles a single
defendant to escape all liability on the theory that the defendant’s actions
benefitted the general public.172 In practice, the distinction between small
groups and a larger public is, predictably, not well defined. Courts have
found benefit to groups as small as a boatload of ferry passengers to
constitute a sufficient “public” for the complete privilege.173
When government agencies such as law enforcement trespass to or
convert private property, it almost always resembles a scenario of public
necessity. In one common fact pattern, an armed fugitive takes shelter in
a single home within a densely occupied neighborhood. The suspect
refuses to surrender and insists on going down in a blaze of gunfire. To
avoid that outcome, local SWAT officers use a bulldozer to strip the
fugitive of his safe haven. Does the SWAT agency have a duty to
compensate the safe but dispossessed homeowner?
Two classic doctrines say “no.” The first is sovereign immunity—a
principle that predates the American Revolution in English common law174
but is also enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.175
Without recourse to the Eleventh Amendment, state attorneys general
defending law enforcement normally need only invoke the common law
or state constitutional provisions that iterate this principle. Under those,
if the agency had acted within its “discretionary function,” it may be

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. § 197 & cmt. a.
Id. § 196 & cmt. a.
See Mouse’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341, 1341 (K.B.).
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
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immune to tort liability for property impairment or destruction.176 The
second principle, already mentioned above, is public necessity.
If successful, a public takings argument against governmental tortfeasors
for property harm defeats these defenses. First, it may mean that the
actions of the state actor constitute a deprivation of property without due
process—a clear constitutional rights violation for which the state cannot
claim immunity. Second, it may mean that the same privileged action by
a private individual to save his neighborhood—for instance destroying
another’s home to create a firebreak amid a brushfire—would be
unprivileged if committed by law enforcement. The fate of such state
action cases turns upon the state’s interpretation of the action. In some
jurisdictions, a SWAT action of the kind described above amounts to an
exercise of eminent domain and bars the public necessity defense.177 In
others, an almost identical tactical decision has been deemed an exercise
of state “police power” and thus not in conflict with the defense of public
necessity.178 Leaving aside the question of whether SWAT officers
exercise discretionary or ministerial functions, the court in the latter case
simply said that tactical police decisions do not constitute takings under
eminent domain.179
Federal influence on state tort law in this area of doctrine is anomalous.
On one hand, it reflects the influence of the well-established constitutional
principle of due process in government torts. On the other, even with
the split interpretations of eminent domain and police power authority,

176. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974) (“[I]n varying scope, a
qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office
and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action which
liability is sought to be based.”).
177. See Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1992).
178. See Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 913 (Cal. 1995). In
accepting public necessity, the court rejected the eminent domain analogy:
In the present case an action for inverse condemnation does not lie, because
the efforts of the law enforcement officers to apprehend a felony suspect
cannot be likened to an exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not a
case in which law enforcement officers commandeered a citizen’s automobile
to chase a fleeing suspect, or appropriated ammunition from a private gun shop
to replenish an inadequate supply. Conceivably, such unusual actions might
constitute an exercise of eminent domain, because private property would be
taken for public use. . . . Application of the just compensation clause in the present
case would mean, for example, that every time a police officer fires a weapon
in the line of duty, that officer exercises the power of eminent domain over any
property that the officer reasonably could foresee might be damaged as a result.
Id. (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 905–06.
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as the court in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. said, this may
be decided by “basic notions of fairness and justice.”180
Constitutional due process has had further influence upon awards of
punitive damages—obliquely interpreted as a form of takings. Although
not by any means limited to application in tort cases, these limits have
had pronounced influence in tort cases where windfall punitive judgments
might previously have stood as incentive for plaintiffs to litigate and for
defendants to settle. Removal of the risk of disproportionate punitive
judgment has, no doubt, also removed from the plaintiffs’ bar a significant
bargaining chip.
This development was ushered in by the seminal case of BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore. There, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that
a punitive damage award could be the subject of a due process challenge
if it was “grossly excessive.”181 In Gore, the plaintiff Ira Gore had
purchased a new BMW automobile from a dealer in Alabama.182 The
dealer delivered the car to Gore without disclosing the fact that it had
suffered a predelivery scratch and been repainted.183 An internal BMW
policy said that presale damage repair that cost less than three percent of
the retail price would not be disclosed to dealers or customers.184 In this
case, the damage totaled less than two percent.185 Gore asserted that this
amounted to fraud under Alabama tort law and prevailed in winning
$4000 in compensatory damages in a jury verdict at trial.186 Alleging
that the conduct was part of a nationwide scheme totaling nearly 1000
retouched vehicles, Gore also convinced the jury to award $4 million in
punitive damages.187 In its words, the jury found the conduct “gross,
oppressive, and malicious.”188 The trial court denied a motion to reduce
that amount, holding that it was not “grossly excessive,” and the Alabama
Supreme Court agreed but reduced it to $2 million on other grounds.189

180. 479 N.W.2d at 42.
181. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (quoting TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id. at 563.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 563–64.
185. Id. at 564.
186. See id. at 565.
187. Id. at 564–65.
188. Id. at 565.
189. Id. at 566–67 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629
(Ala. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 559).
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The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether this amount was
grossly excessive or necessary to further the “State’s legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”190 In making this
evaluation, the Court reflected upon the wide diversity of states’ policies:
No one doubts that a State may protect its citizens by prohibiting deceptive
trade practices and by requiring automobile distributors to disclose presale
repairs that affect the value of a new car. But the States need not, and in fact
do not, provide such protection in a uniform manner. Some States rely on the
judicial process to formulate and enforce an appropriate disclosure requirement
by applying principles of contract and tort law. Other States have enacted
various forms of legislation that define the disclosure obligations of automobile
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. The result is a patchwork of rules
representing the diverse policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 States.
That diversity demonstrates that reasonable people may disagree about the
value of a full disclosure requirement. Some legislatures may conclude that
affirmative disclosure requirements are unnecessary because the self-interest of
those involved in the automobile trade in developing and maintaining the
goodwill of their customers will motivate them to make voluntary disclosures
or to refrain from selling cars that do not comply with self-imposed standards.
Those legislatures that do adopt affirmative disclosure obligations may take
into account the cost of government regulation, choosing to draw a line
exempting minor repairs from such a requirement. In formulating a disclosure
standard, States may also consider other goals, such as providing a “safe harbor”
for automobile manufacturers, distributors, and dealers against lawsuits over
minor repairs.191

In addressing the grossly excessive question, the Court was in effect
eliminating some of the wide diversity it describes here. Because of the
different expectations on disclosure nationwide, the Alabama Supreme
Court had said that a punitive award far in excess of the compensatory
damage award was an undue effort to deter lawful conduct in states
beyond the one at issue.192 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed but further
took issue with the Alabama court. It assessed the punitive award according
to (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the disparity
between the compensatory award and the punitive award; and (3) the
difference between the punitives awarded here and in similar cases.193
The Court reasoned that BMW’s conduct within the jurisdiction was not
of a high degree of reprehensibility,194 the compensatory-punitive ratio
of 1:500 was too high,195 and the assumption that a lower sanction would
not have proven deterrent was unjustifiable.196 Finally, affirming that
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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See id. at 568.
Id. at 568–70 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 567 (citing Gore, 646 So. 2d at 627).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 585.
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even large, mass-market tortfeasors were entitled under due process to
notice of their legal requirements before a large punitive judgment could
be assessed against them,197 the Court held the damage amount to be
excessive and reversed and remanded.
Although the majority criticized the 1:500 ratio in Gore, it stipulated
that a mathematical formula as to excess amounts could not be
prescribed.198 Nevertheless, the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell reached a numerical ratio guideline to determine
excessive awards in cases of ordinary economic damage amounts.199
Curtis Campbell had caused a fatal auto accident in which one was killed
and a second person disabled.200 His insurance provider State Farm
resisted liability and declined to settle for an amount within Campbell’s
$50,000 policy coverage.201 The company took the dispute to trial and
made assurances to Campbell and his family that they would never be
held liable and required no independent counsel.202 Instead, a Utah jury
found Campbell liable for nearly $150,000, and State Farm refused to
appeal.203 Then, in the suit against State Farm for several claims including
fraud and emotional distress, the Campbells won $2.6 million in
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitives, which were
ultimately reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively.204 The
Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitives, and the U.S.
Supreme Court granted review.205 It held that under the first Gore prong,
the reprehensibility of State Farm’s conduct could be assessed only in
relation to the Campbells and was therefore small, and under the second
prong, the 1:145 ratio was excessive.206 As the Court reasoned,
We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award
cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established
demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit

197. Id. at 585–86.
198. Id. at 582.
199. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
200. Id. at 412–13.
201. Id. at 413.
202. Id. (quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142
(Utah 2001), rev’d, 538 U.S. 408).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 415.
205. Id. at 415–16.
206. Id. at 423–24, 426.
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ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process.207

B. Federal Preemption
The richest and most extensive area of tort federalization occurs in
federal preemption by congressional act. Here, multiple complex canons
of doctrine and interpretation intersect to create a flexible tapestry of
cooperation and disjuncture between state and federal sovereign powers.
Among these arise questions of congressional intent, institutional
competency, judicial efficiency, and the cultural history of American
federalism itself. Underpinning those are perhaps even deeper issues
about nationhood and national uniformity in a vast geopolitical and
pluralist landscape.
1. Authority and Types
Authority for federal preemption of state tort law originates with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution’s Article VI. Its language says
that
[t]his Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.208

Although constitutional supremacy requires no further elaboration, the
Court has established a body of doctrine that says legislative supremacy
must be assessed with recourse to congressional intent and that where
such intent is ambiguous, it will read federal legislation with a
“presumption against preemption”—a doctrine inscribed into the canons
of statutory interpretation.209 Preemption may ultimately be found for one
of two reasons: either the law expressly preempts state causes of action
on the same subject matter or it creates through purpose and structure an
implied preemption of such claims. As some have pointed out, antipreemption provisions typically enjoy greater deference.210
207. Id. at 425.
208. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
209. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (applying
the presumption against preemption in a tort context). Several have argued that this
presumption is deployed so erratically across the case law as to be nearly unusable. See,
e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 298 (2000); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449,
458 (2008).
210. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of
State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 443, 447 (2009).
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Express preemption is relatively straightforward and requires a finding
of clear language on the face of the federal statute indicating that the
legislation removes the right of a class of tort victims to seek redress in
state court.211 Where such express language is clear, the court’s primary
task is to determine whether the state statute or common law claim is one
that the federal statute comprehends to preempt. Thus, in Altria Group, Inc.
v. Good, the Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act did not preempt a claim under a Maine trade practices law enabling
a suit for fraudulent misrepresentation of cigarette smoking risks.212 “If
a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not
immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and
scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains.”213
Accordingly, even express provisions articulating intent to preempt have
been discarded.214
Implied preemption is more nuanced. A federal statute may overcome
the presumption against preemption if it addresses subject matter,
notwithstanding the absence of any explicit language to preclude a state
law or claim, that would place enforcement in conflict with the state
rule, or subject matter in an area of social or economic life that Congress
has claimed as its domain.215 These two forms are often known as conflict
preemption and field preemption.216 Conflict preemption allows the court to
displace state law on the basis that its application stands in direct conflict
with a federal rule.217 More rare in the context of tort preemption, field
preemption allows a court to invalidate a state rule if it intervenes where
Congress has not directly legislated but intended to “occup[y] the field.”218
Although determination of intent to “occupy” a field is a matter of
substantial debate, even the clearer notion of normative “conflict” is a
matter of substantial controversy.219

211. Schuck, supra note 22, at 79.
212. 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008).
213. Id. at 76.
214. See, e.g., infra notes 380–82 and accompanying text.
215. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
216. See Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997).
217. See English, 496 U.S. at 79.
218. Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 780 (8th
Cir. 2009).
219. See Eric S. Almon, Comment, Preemption of State Failure-To-Warn Claims
After Wyeth v. Levine: The Regulatory Function of State Tort Law, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 215,
224–25 (2010).
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Finally, another important distinction must be made between regulatory
preemption and tort preemption. Under regulatory preemption, a state
may be precluded from implementing its own regulatory rule over a
substantive area because the federal regime has been held to expressly or
impliedly preempt such action.220 In such instances, it is important to
note, no individual claim is necessarily left uncompensated. Rather, the
state is precluded from exercising its oversight. This differs from
common law tort preemption in that the latter involves decisions whether
or not private causes of action can be maintained under state tort law
given federal legislation or agency policy.221 If the court decides that
they cannot, an individual is often left without redress because the tortfeasor
has complied with a federal statute or agency provision. Some have
argued that this critical feature makes federal preemption of tort claims a
constitutional issue.222 Those claims, they suggest, represent a fundamental
civil right effectively denied under color of federal law, and therefore, such
denials demand systematic substitution of an alternative scheme for
compensation akin to workers’ compensation or superfund rules.223 This
argument resembles those that say denial of state governmental tort
liability under sovereign immunity itself constitutes a taking and demands
federal court review.224 Notwithstanding these significant objections to
preemption regimes, the courts have interpreted federal statutes to
preclude common law tort actions in a variety of different but clustered
cases. In most instances, these acts of Congress are beyond constitutional
review and assumed to fall within the ambit of Article I authorities—
most commonly the commerce power.225 Because these statutes are thusly
directed at specific social and economic behaviors within that purview,
cases arising under them are clustered around substantive aspects of
sociocultural life in a manner that permits modest generalization about
patterns of tort federalization through preemption. As some have said,
preemption is in many respects among the last holdouts of horizontal

220. See Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era,
59 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 821–22 (1998).
221. See Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the “Crazy Quilt” of Cipollone: A
Divided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1494 (1997).
222. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 529.
223. See id. at 572, 593, 626.
224. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and The Takings
Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 312 (1988).
225. See infra notes 355–56 and accompanying text.
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federalism jurisprudence.226 A closer look at its sociocultural implications
is thus highly instructive.
2. Social and Economic Activity
Preemption cases have arisen around key substantive areas of national
social and economic life. Several of these areas have sedimented into
detailed, nuanced canons of doctrine for when federal statutes or
regulatory compliance may preclude a tort claim in state court. These
canons cover, among other things, the fields of transport and aviation,
food and drug, environmental protection, and labor relations. In proposing
a federalism function to tort law, we must understand the role state court
adjudicators play in finding that tort suits in these areas are preempted.
When such findings are made, the state court judge acts, in effect, as the
“front-line” in the unique and comprehensive enactment of American
federalism.227 This then raises the following questions: why are these
specific areas the most preempted, and why are we most comfortable asking
state courts to defer on them? This is a different goal than assessing the
propriety of any one preemption decision.
a. Transport and Aviation Safety
Congress’s authority to regulate transport and aviation is well settled.228
It derives from the Commerce Clause in perhaps the most sensible
manner of all authorities discussed here.229 Highway and air travel
implicate movement across state lines and in their physicality demand a
certain uniformity of parameters across the national landscape. Thus,
automobile safety requirements should probably remain uniformly reliable
across state boundaries first because the products themselves are made
and sold in different places, second because once sold they carry people
and goods across these lines, and third because they make use of and
interact closely with the interstate highway system.

226. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557,
558 (2000).
227. Gluck, supra note 17, at 544.
228. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Vill. of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871, 879
(E.D.N.Y. 1955).
229. See id.
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Automobile safety is governed by, among other laws and entities, the
National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).230 In
the wake of Ralph Nader’s 1960s push for greater vehicle safety, the
Highway Safety Act of 1970 created the administration within the
Department of Transportation.231 Over the years, the NHTSA has
promulgated standards regulating the level of minimum safety required
for cars sold across states.232 Then, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
the Supreme Court reviewed a state common law tort claim for the
serious injury of a young motorist who, in 1992, while driving a Honda
Accord, collided with a tree.233 Under the NHTSA’s Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, Honda was required to have equipped
some of its 1987 vehicles with “passive restraint” systems.234 This
requirement gave Honda discretion as to which system—lap belts, shoulder
belts, airbags, and so forth—it would implement.235 Ms. Geier’s Accord
was given only lap and shoulder belts, and the issue for the district court
was whether Honda’s failure to install airbags was, in light of its
compliance with FMVSS 208, shielded from liability under state court
products liability claims.236 The district court found that the standard’s
express preemption provision covered precisely this kind of common
law claim.237 But, although the NHTSA did articulate express preemption,
it also contained a “‘savings’ clause”—language seeking to preserve the
state cause of action.238 Despite this tension, the appeals court found
implied preemption because the state cause of action would interfere or
be in conflict with the purpose of the national standard.239 The Supreme
Court, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Breyer, agreed with the
appeals court.240
In 2011, the Court heard a similar set of issues in Williamson v. Mazda
Motor of America, Inc. There, a unanimous court upheld the findings in
Geier that neither an express preemption clause nor a savings clause
would dispose of conflict preemption, but it found that the state court
230. Who We Are and What We Do, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/
Who+We+Are+and+What+We+Do (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
231. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 258 n.4 (1987); Who We Are and
What We Do, supra note 230.
232. Who We Are and What We Do, supra note 230.
233. 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000).
234. Id. at 864–65.
235. See id. at 875.
236. Id. at 865, 881.
237. Id. at 865.
238. Id. at 865–66 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 863, 865.
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claim for failure to install shoulder belts in a rear inner car seat were not
in conflict with a later version of FMVSS 208.241 Said the Court, “Like
the regulation in Geier, the regulation here leaves the manufacturer with a
choice. And, like the tort suit in Geier, the tort suit here would restrict
that choice. But unlike Geier, we do not believe here that choice is a
significant regulatory objective.”242
Aviation safety, meanwhile, is regulated under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (FAA), which established the Federal Aviation Administration
following a series of disastrous air collisions between civilian and
military planes.243 Although other federal statutes regulate the air industry,
including the Airline Deregulation Act, which establishes standards as to
“rates, routes and services,” or the General Aviation Revitalization Act,
which limits aircraft manufacturer liability, the FAA is the primary piece
of legislation that arises in safety cases.244 There, the issue is always
whether, notwithstanding the FAA’s express preemption and savings
clauses, there is a question regarding displacement of state safety rules.
In common law tort claims, this most directly affects application of an
airline standard of care.
To date, there is no unified Supreme Court holding as to the overall
preemptive effect of the FAA. Instead, there are a variety of fact-specific
jurisdictional interpretations over, inter alia, safety standards for pilot training
and conduct,245 overhead luggage storage,246 and adequate warnings
in situations of air turbulence.247 In Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,
a widely influential case involving failure to give verbal warnings and
personal injury during air turbulence en route from New York to San
Juan, Puerto Rico, the Third Circuit held that the FAA preempts state
rules for air safety but preserves state damage rules.248 In effect, as

241. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1133–36, 1139–40
(2011).
242. Id. at 1137.
243. Michael J. Holland, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Preemption in
the Field of Air Safety, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 11, 12 (2011).
244. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, 41713 (2006).
245. See, e.g., French v. Pan Am. Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989).
246. Holland, supra note 243, at 18–19 (citing Margolies-Mezvinsky v. U.S. Air
Corp., No. CIV. A 98-1526, 2000 WL 122355 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 1, 2000)).
247. Id. at 16–18 (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir.
1999)).
248. 181 F.3d at 365, 376.
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modified by subsequent case law in the Third Circuit,249 Abdullah
established a federal standard of care for airline safety for personal injury
harms that occur in the air. Taking the FAA at its word, this standard of
care demands that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless and
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”250
Meanwhile, other courts, including at least one in the Second Circuit,
have rejected FAA preemption of state safety standards.251 “Although
an impressive array of cases have followed Abdullah,” writes one
commentator,
there are number of cases that have examined the doctrine, found it to be
wanting, and held that the Abdullah case, which is binding only in the Third
Circuit, is not persuasive and that there was no overall intent by Congress to
preempt negligence claims if plaintiffs were unable to show a violation of the
federal standard of care.252

The question of preemption in auto and aviation safety may not be settled
uniformly with recourse to the language of the Highway Safety Act of
1970 or the FAA. As in all preemption cases, decisions turn on the quixotic
determination of congressional intent—often in opposition to prima facie
reading of the statutes themselves—combined with fact-driven analysis
of whether this precise manner of harm was contemplated in the
rulemakers’ scope.253
b. Food and Drug
Food and drug safety is a second axis around which federal preemption
cases have clustered. This is likely because the sector is so pervasive,
covering some twenty-five percent of U.S. consumer spending,254 and
because defendants in these fields are now more often than not massmarket interstate and international actors. Classically, harm from food
and drug products has been recoverable under state negligence and

249. See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that Abdullah preemption does not extend to the disembarkation process); Abdullah,
181 F.3d at 376.
250. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2013).
251. See Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 160, 164 (E.D.N.Y.
2000).
252. Holland, supra note 243, at 23
253. In Levy v. Continental Airlines, Inc., for example, the court decided whether to
extend a ruling on harm from a bag that had fallen from an overhead compartment to
harm from a ceramic bowl that had fallen from the same. No. 07-1266, 2007 WL
2844592, at *1–4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2007); see also Holland, supra note 243, at 18, 28
(citing Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 376) (discussing Abdullah’s holding).
254. Gardiner Harris, The Safety Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at MM44.
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products liability laws.255 After 1976, medical devices were separated and
regulated with express congressional intent to preempt state tort law, and
after 2009, tobacco products were brought within food and drug regulatory
powers also through congressional act. 256 For historical reasons,
notwithstanding significant juridical overlap between them, this subpart
separately describes federal preemption of tort first in drug regulation,
then in medical devices, and finally in tobacco products.
i. Pharmaceuticals
Congress passed the Federal Food and Drug Act in 1906 as the “first
significant public health law” that prohibited the manufacture and
distribution of adulterated or misprinted drugs.257 The Act was initially
viewed as a supplement to state common law regulation and civil
remedies.258 In 1938, Congress then passed the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which innovated a new “premarket approval”
process that included labeling oversight.259 At that time, if a drug was
unsafe, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) carried the burden to
prove this to forestall distribution.260 In 1962, this was amended so that
the manufacturer carried the burden to show “safety” and “effectiveness”
for market approval, and Congress added a savings clause protecting
state tort claims except in cases of “direct and positive conflict” with the
FDCA.261 For purposes of congressional intent for federal preemption in
food and drug industries, no further changes were made to FDA authority
before the seminal case of Wyeth v. Levine reached the Supreme Court.
This is especially significant because, as many have pointed out, “the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
case.”262

255. See, e.g., Hazelton v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 745 P.2d 309, 310 (Kan. Ct. App.
1987).
256. See infra notes 298–99, 327–28 and accompanying text.
257. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566 (2009).
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 567 (citing Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 102(c),
104(b), 202, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 781, 784, 793 (1962) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 355(d)–(e) (2006))).
262. Id. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Diana Levine was an independent professional musician who had
dedicated her life to creativity and service. As she explained,
Back in 1989, my husband and I started a label, called Rebop Records, which I
did to combine my passion for music and songwriting, and my love for kids.
I played bass, guitar and piano. Sometimes, I’d play with my sister, who lives
nearby, or my husband in local bands. The label was designed to provide rock
and roll that kids and parents could enjoy together.263

After a long history of migraine headaches and associated nausea, Levine
went to a Vermont clinic in 2000 for treatment for these symptoms.264
As per custom, the clinic administered Demerol for the migraine and
Phenergan for the nausea.265 However, whereas the clinicians normally
administered Phenergan via intramuscular injection, on this occasion, the
staff administered the drug via “push IV”—a system similar to intravenous
drip except the drug is actively pumped into the vein.266 Unfortunately,
as known to drug manufacturer Wyeth, Phenergan administered by
push IV created risks of causing gangrene and amputation in some
patients.267 To avoid this risk, health professionals could simply use
alternative methods of delivery such as intramuscular injection—the
method with which Levine was familiar.268
Sadly, Levine contracted gangrene as a result of the mistake and—
within weeks—lost her right hand to amputation.269 Although her music
performance career was largely over, her legal battle had just begun.
Levine’s claims against the clinic and staff were settled early, but she
was forced to litigate against Wyeth.270 Then, in March 2004, following
trial, a Vermont court awarded damages in the final amount of $6.7
million.271 In a special verdict, the jury found that Wyeth had been
negligent and strictly liable for distributing Phenergan with a defective
warning label that omitted the risk of gangrene from push IV delivery.272

263. Ed Silverman, Preemption and Amputation: Diana Fights Wyeth, PHARMALOT
(Feb. 20, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://www.licensinglaw.net/BusinessTransactions_files/
Wyeth_v_Levine.pdf.
264. Id.
265. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 559–60.
268. See id. at 559–60 & n.1 (“Phenergan can be administered intramuscularly or
intravenously . . . . [Wyeth’s warning stated that d]ue to the close proximity of arteries
and veins in the areas most commonly used for intravenous injection, extreme care should be
exercised to avoid perivascular extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection.”).
269. Id. at 559.
270. See id.
271. Levine v. Wyeth, No. 670-12-01 Wncv, 2004 WL 5452938 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Mar. 17, 2004).
272. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 562.
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The problem for Wyeth and its attorneys, however, was that the extant
label on Phenergan had been approved by the FDA first in the 1950s,
then with supplements in the mid-1970s.273 Wyeth filed a third application
in 1981 in light of new labeling rules, but the agency failed to conclusively
respond to that request for seventeen years.274 In 1987, the agency
requested Wyeth revise its label to include risks of arterial exposure of
the kind later suffered by Levine.275 In 1988, Wyeth again submitted an
application incorporating those risks, but it went entirely unanswered.276
Finally, in 1996, the agency ordered Wyeth to maintain the contents of
its extant label, and in 1998, it approved the 1981 application.277 In its
post-trial motion, Wyeth argued that the jury verdict must be discarded
because of these contradictions.278 How, it asked, could it be liable in
state court when it met and was prevented from exceeding “minimum
standards” set by the FDA for adequate risk warning?279 Compliance
with the state warning standard, it said, would run afoul of the agency’s
label approval process. Adherence to the FDA’s process, meanwhile,
ran afoul of state products liability and negligence law.280 For Wyeth, this
was a prime case for conflict preemption.
The trial judge denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law
requested on the basis of conflict preemption.281 It referred to an FDA
exception for label approval that allowed manufacturers to change their
warnings provisionally in light of new risks.282 For the trial court, as
well as on appeal at the Vermont Supreme Court, this provisional change
process meant state and federal law in this instance were simply not in
conflict with one another and that compliance with both was possible.283
Interpreting the Vermont decision to uphold the trial court, the Supreme
Court later wrote, “[T]he jury verdict established only that Phenergan’s

273. Id. at 561.
274. Id. at 561–62.
275. Id. at 561.
276. Id. at 561–62.
277. Id. at 562.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 562–63.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. Id. at 562.
283. See id. at 562–63 (quoting Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, ¶ 6, 183 Vt. 76,
944 A.2d 179).
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warning was insufficient. It did not mandate a particular replacement
warning.”284
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in part to settle the growing
uncertainty in FDA preemption.285 Wyeth argued not only that state and
federal labeling rules warranted conflict preemption but that alternatively,
they deserved application of a form of field preemption.286 According to
Wyeth, even if compliance with both standards was not impossible, the
state rule was at least an “obstacle” to fulfilling congressional intent to
place drug labeling oversight squarely in the hands of experts at the FDA.287
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens rejected both arguments. The
first still fell short for reasons outlined by the trial and Vermont Supreme
Courts. Stevens fixed upon 21 C.F.R. section 314.70(c), the 1982 regulation
that created the “Changes Being Effected” provisional approval for new
warnings.288 “[T]his ‘changes being effected’ (CBE) regulation,” he wrote,
provides that if a manufacturer is changing a label to “add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction” or to “add or strengthen
an instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to increase the
safe use of the drug product,” it may make the labeling change upon filing its
supplemental application with the FDA; it need not wait for FDA approval.289

As to the second argument, the court distinguished its recent holding
in Geier. Whereas the NHTSA safety law in Geier had contained an
express preemption clause, the FDA regulation and amendments did not.
Whereas the FMVSS 208 in Geier had prescribed a specific range of
passive safety restraint systems, leading the Court to infer congressional
intent to promote this variety over and above a state-specific definition
of defect, the FDA regulation and amendments did not prescribe any
specific language for drug labeling and rather prescribed only labels that
were adequate.290 Both statues had savings clauses, but the Wyeth court felt
that enforcement of food and drug—industries so pervasive and minute
in their labeling—required the cooperation of state courts adjudicating
common law products liability and negligence actions.291 This
interpretation of the FDCA was guided by the agency’s own history and
circumscribed functions:

284. Id. at 565.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 589, 594 (Thomas, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 594 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
288. See id. at 568 (majority opinion).
289. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008)).
290. See id. at 580.
291. See id. at 567, 581.
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[T]he FDA traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of drug
regulation. The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the
market, and manufacturers have superior access to information about their
drugs, especially in the post-marketing phase as new risks emerge. State tort
suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct
compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward
with information.292

The dissenting Justices did not share this view of Wyeth’s distinction
from Geier. If anything, they said, Wyeth’s attempts to modify its label
and the FDA’s long silence and later mandate to hold the current line
were strong indications that the company should not bear responsibility
for Levine’s amputation.293 Seeming to sidestep the CBE process that
would render a label change possible, Justice Alito dwelled upon ultimate
FDA responsibility for determining label “adequacy” and rehashed the
long-settled causation issue of the case.294 He then concluded ultimately
that state court juries were ill-equipped to properly decide the technical
question of adequacy delegated to a federal agency.295 Interestingly,
however, despite this low opinion of the lay jury, Alito did not rule out
shared federal-state oversight. “To be sure,” he wrote, “state tort suits
can peacefully coexist with the FDA’s labeling regime, and they have
done so for decades. But this case is far from peaceful coexistence. The
FDA told Wyeth that Phenergan’s label renders its use ‘safe.’ But the
State of Vermont, through its tort law, said: ‘Not so.’”296
ii. Medical Devices
Since the mid-1970s, medical devices have been treated distinctively
from pharmaceuticals under FDA authority. Under historic FDA oversight,
the agency could mandate only withdrawal of unsafe devices but did not
maintain a regime of premarket approval.297 By the mid-seventies, injury
from implanted devices such as heart pacemakers and intrauterine devices
had skyrocketed, prompting Congress to pass the 1976 Medical Device

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 578–79 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 628 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 605, 612–21.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 628 (citation omitted).
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
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Amendments (MDA).298 The MDA established a three-tiered classification
of devices with different approval protocols for each. Although Class I
and II devices included simple products such as bandages and home
pregnancy tests, respectively, Class III included more invasive and
potentially harmful products such as pacemakers and breast implants.299
Class III devices were subject to the FDA’s “premarket approval” (PMA)
process; however after immediately recognizing the impracticability of
reviewing the safety and efficacy of each and every device, Congress
established major exemptions to PMA if the product had already been
in the market or if it was “substantially equivalent” to an extant approved
device.300 Whereas full PMA review entails on average 1200 hours of
work for the agency, the “substantial equivalence” exemption process on
average requires something closer to twenty.301
The MDA offered a stark case study in the persisting ambiguities in
federal preemption of state regulation, negligence, and products liability.
Prior to 1976, states including California and New Jersey had passed
legislation regulating specific devices and demanding premarket approval.302
As many have said, further development and enforcement of such statespecific rules may mean certain unpredictability and impracticability
for device manufacturers operating on a national scale. Cognizant of
this, the MDA was given an express clause that appears emphatic in its
preemptive effect:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—(1) which is
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter
to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device
or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter.303

Several items render this clause unclear for statutory interpretation by
lower court judges. Definition of phrases such as “different from” and “in
298. See Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA
Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2129, 2131 (2000) (citing S. REP. NO.
94-33, at 6 (1975)).
299. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012); Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by
FDA for Marketing, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/resourcesforyou/consumers/
ucm142523.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2009).
300. 21 U.S.C.§ 360e (2012).
301. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477 (citing Medical Devices and Drug Issues:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 100th Cong. 384 (1987) (statement of James S. Benson, Deputy Director,
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration).
302. See N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 806 (N.J.
1978); H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 45–46 (1976).
303. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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addition to” is one such item, while the statute’s own subsequent savings
clause is another.304
The effect of such ambiguities has led to complex and, some would
say, draconian interpretations of the MDA—a point illustrated in Medtronic
v. Lohr. There, Lora Lohr, a recipient of a pacemaker device made by
Medtronic, experienced symptoms of heart failure when her implanted
device suddenly failed three years into service.305 The failure required
Lohr to undergo emergency heart surgery, and she later sued the
manufacturer in negligence and products liability.306 After successfully
removing the suit to federal court, Medtronic argued that it had complied
with the FDA approval process and that the claims were thus preempted.307
In this case, the Medtronic model was approved under the abbreviated
substantially equivalent process discussed above.308 The company argued
that its compliance with the amended FDA rules should preempt any
state common law claim.309 Although the district court agreed and dismissed
the action, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on preemption of the negligence
claim but affirmed as to the manufacture and warning defect claims.310
Viewing this distinction as arbitrary, the Supreme Court voted to
reinstate the common law claims insofar as the MDA did not intend to
preempt all common law actions such as this.311 The Court held that the
MDA’s “substantially equivalent” language was not sufficiently specific
to preempt common law claims.312
Finally, in 2008, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. modified the rule from Lohr.
Charles Riegel and his wife sued Medtronic under New York common
law for a balloon catheter that ruptured during Riegel’s heart surgery.313
Although the device had been clearly labeled for maximum inflation
pressure, Riegel’s surgeon inflated the balloon beyond that maximum
before it finally burst.314 Riegel developed a heart block, was put on life

304. See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (2012).
305. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480–81.
306. Id. at 481.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 480.
309. Id. at 481.
310. Id. at 483 (citing Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1349–50 (11th Cir.
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 518 U.S. 470).
311. Id. at 501.
312. Id. at 494.
313. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008).
314. Id. at 320.
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support, and required an emergency bypass operation.315 A New York
district court held that the claims for strict liability, breach of warranty,
negligence, and loss of consortium were all preempted under the MDA.316
The Second Circuit affirmed each of these on the basis that any successful
claim would impose standards on the device different from those
established in the PMA process, which Medtronic had followed without
incident.317
In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia in which Roberts, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined, the Court distinguished Lohr.
Under their analysis, the preemption issue turned on the differential between
full premarket approval and the lesser FDCA § 510(k) substantial
equivalence process. 318 Although the latter did not establish precise
requirements as to “safety and effectiveness” in labeling and manufacturing,
the former—the extensive PMA process prescribed by the MDA—did.
Said the Court,
Premarket approval . . . imposes “requirements” under the MDA as we
interpreted it in Lohr. Unlike general labeling duties, premarket approval is
specific to individual devices. And it is in no sense an exemption from Federal
safety review—it is federal safety review. . . . [T]he attributes that Lohr found
lacking in § 510(k) review are present here. . . . [T]he FDA requires a device
that has received premarket approval to be made with almost no deviations
from the specifications in its approval application, for the reason that the FDA
has determined that the approved form provides a reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness.319

The Court then grappled with whether the requirements imposed under
successful common law claims were “different from”320 the FDA
requirements established through PMA. First, it said that the common
law nature of the duties entailed in the negligence and other claims
should be treated similarly to state regulatory rules in determining “different
from.” Citing both Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC and Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., it said that “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a
State’s ‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties.” 321 Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion reminded the Court that congressional intent
to remove common law recourse was lacking, but the majority took a

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 321 (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 121 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 322–23.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324.
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position seemingly at odds with what it had previously said about
legislative purpose.322
It is not our job to speculate upon congressional motives. If we were to do so,
however, the only indication available—the text of the statute—suggests that
the solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved devices, which the dissent
finds controlling, was overcome in Congress’s estimation by solicitude for
those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to
apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations.323

Finally, the majority allowed that common law claims premised on
violation of the federal regulatory duties would not be “different from or
in addition to” and that in that case, the Riegels could have succeeded.324
Although the Riegels argued that this was the case for their claims, the
majority relied upon their arguments at trial that Medtronic had violated
common law duties despite compliance with the MDA.325
After Riegel, then, preemption of medical device claims is determined
by a two-fold analysis of whether the state claim imposes new
“requirements,” and whether those are “different from or in addition to”
the federal rules. The first question seems to turn on, among other things,
the difference between full premarket approval and FDCA § 510(k)
exceptional approval for extant and substantially similar devices and the
second upon whether the claims assert negligence or strict liability on
the basis of breach of federal regulatory duties or despite compliance
therewith. In any case, the Court has repeatedly expressed deep suspicion
of lay state juries determining liability in the presence of coexisting
federal regulatory standards—a fact that adds another dramatic layer to
the federalization of civil justice.326

322. Id. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
323. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326 (majority opinion).
324. See id. at 330 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
325. Id.
326. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 628 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Regardless of the FDA’s reasons for not contraindicating IV push for these drugs, it is
odd (to say the least) that a jury in Vermont can now order for Phenergan what the FDA
has chosen not to order for mustard gas.”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504
(1996) (Breyer, J., concurring); supra text accompanying note 323.
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iii. Cigarettes
Although cigarette safety and labeling are now regulated under the
FDA, for most of recent history, these arenas of regulation came simply
under the freestanding Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA) of 1965 requiring a “conspicuous label warning of smoking’s
health hazards to be placed on every package of cigarettes sold in this
country.”327 That Act was then amended by the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969.328
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court heard arguments
on behalf of a New Jersey man whose mother died of lung cancer
following roughly forty years of smoking.329 The defendant Liggett had
advertised itself as a healthier alternative to other cigarette brands, and
evidence showed that the victim had in fact relied on such advertising.330
In district court, the plaintiffs alleged claims under New Jersey state law,
including design defect, failure to warn, negligence, breach of express
warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation.331 The defendant argued all
state law claims arising after 1965 were preempted by the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.332 Although it found that the Act was
intended to create a national standard, the district court found that it did
not preempt common law claims.333 At the Second Circuit, the decision
was reversed on the grounds that although the Act did not expressly
preempt common law claims, such claims were in conflict with the federal
law.334 Said that court, “Where the success of a state law damages claim
necessarily depends on the assertion that a party bore the duty to provide
a warning to consumers in addition to the warning Congress has required
on cigarette packages, such claims are preempted as conflicting with the
Act.”335 Following the denial of certiorari, the district court on remand
held that most of the claims were indeed preempted but that the jury
could be instructed on negligence—breach of duty to warn—and express

327. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 504 (1992) (citing Pub. L. No.
89-82, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (1988))).
328. Id. at 515 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1969) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (1988))).
329. Id. at 508.
330. See id. at 509–10.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 510.
333. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148, 1153–70
(D.N.J. 1984), rev’d, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986)).
334. Id. at 511.
335. Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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warranties.336 Following a finding of contributory fault on the part of
Mrs. Cipollone, the jury awarded only her husband damages for breach
of express warranty in the amount of $400,000.337 The Second Circuit
then affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider
preemption.338 The Court held that the 1965 Act did not preempt common
law damages but the 1969 Act did preempt failure to warn and what it
called warning “neutralization”—the defeat of an otherwise effective
warning by additional extraneous information or representations.339 It
also held that the 1969 law did not preempt express warranty, fraud and
misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims.340
The Cipollone plurality was then clarified in 2008’s Altria Group, Inc.
v. Good. There, a Maine plaintiff brought suit against Philip Morris for
fraudulent misrepresentation under a state unfair trade practices law.341
Philip Morris had marketed its “light” cigarettes as a safer alternative to
regular brands, and the plaintiff allegedly relied upon that advertising
while smoking “lights” for over fifteen years during which time he
developed cancer.342 The merits of the misrepresentation were never
reached at trial as the district court treated the claims under Cipollone as
“failure-to-warn or warning neutralization” claims and dismissed on the
grounds of federal preemption.343 The First Circuit on appeal reversed,
treating the claim more properly as one for the intentional tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation.344 On review, the Supreme Court agreed and held
that common law fraud could not be expressly or impliedly preempted
by the FCLAA.345 Although the Act did contain two express preemption
clauses, these were written to prescribe accurate labeling as to the risks
of smoking to human health.346 It was not, the Court said, written to
eclipse a common law “duty not to deceive.”347

336. Id. at 512 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669–75
(D.N.J. 1986)).
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 527, 530–31.
340. Id. at 531.
341. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 72–73 (2008).
342. Id.
343. See id. at 75.
344. See id.
345. Id. at 91.
346. Id. at 79.
347. Id. at 81.
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In a rich dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas distinguished between
Cipollone’s plurality test, which he described as a “predicate-duty”
approach, and one he advocated, originating from Justice Scalia’s
Cipollone dissent, which Scalia described as a “proximate application”
approach.348 Under predicate duty, the Cipollone plurality had premised its
finding of nonpreemption on the duties intended by Congress in passing the
FCLAA and subsequent amendments.349 There, as in Altria, the Court
said, Congress meant to create regulatory duties to disclose accurate health
information and not common law-type duties to represent oneself or
one’s product truthfully.350 Justice Thomas, meanwhile, advocated Justice
Scalia’s proximate application approach that focused upon the deterrent
rather than compensatory function of the coexisting common law claim.351
In advocating for Justice Scalia’s position, Justice Thomas left aside his
belief in jury incapacity to decide such claims accurately and consistently
and seemingly condemned the coexistence of even valid jury awards:
“Applying the proper test – i.e., whether a jury verdict on respondents
claims would ‘impose an obligation’ on the cigarette manufacturer ‘because
of the effect of smoking upon health,’ . . . respondents’ state-law claims
are expressly preempted by § 5(b) of the Labeling Act.”352
c. Environment
Environmental regulation forms the third large cluster of federal
preemption decisions. Here, scale is an even more stark and controversial
leitmotif. On one hand, effective environmental conservation demands
policies to apply uniformly on very large scales—often national or
international in scope.353 On the other hand, this is one area in which
lawmakers may wish to permit a state and local “race to the top.”354 For
the betterment of the environmental future, which is then preferable: legal
uniformity or legal innovation? This debate immediately implicates
federalism and federal preemption.

348. Id. at 96–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
349. Id. at 94 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528–29 (1992)).
350. Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528–29).
351. See id. at 96.
352. Id. at 109 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)) (citation omitted).
353. See Paul S. Weiland, Comment, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 248 tbl.1 (2000).
354. See id. See generally Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is
There a “Race” and Is It “To the Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3 (2011)
(discussing scholars who believe “state renewable portfolio standards . . . signify a regulatory
‘race to the top’”).
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Congress has regulated environmental pollution for decades under the
commerce power reserved to it in Article I.355 At the same time, authority
to regulate matters of public health and safety is considered one of the
“police powers” reserved to the various states under the Tenth
Amendment.356 Because of this dual authority and because of the sheer
geographic scale on which pollution migrates, environmental protection
has been shared between state and federal governments.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) air
quality regime under the Clean Air Act allows the agency to set National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and then to require states to
“develop a general plan to attain and maintain the NAAQS in all areas of
the country and a specific plan to attain the standards for each area
designated nonattainment for a NAAQS.”357 The EPA sets minimum
standards, and the states are expected to implement them in ways best
tailored to their regional needs. This is especially valuable given
the distinct industrial pollutants common to different states, as well as
the way geography can help or hinder air quality control.358 This State
Implementation Plan regime lends itself to a Brandeisian view of federalism
as state experimentation,359 but the approach has its critics—notably those
in corporate America who would like to see national uniformity imposed
by “ceiling preemption.”360 Under ceiling preemption, the states would
be required not only to implement air quality regulations that maintain
minimum standards but also to abstain from regulations that exceed a
certain common level of regulation.361 Proponents of this approach point
to California, which obtained a preemption waiver from the EPA early
355. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
356. U.S. CONST. amend. X; James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public
Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health
Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 102 (1997).
357. State Implementation Plan Status and Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/urbanair/sipstatus/index.html (last updated Feb.
25, 2013).
358. See Kathryn B. Thomson, Message from the Vice Chair, AIR QUALITY COMMITTEE
NEWSL. (ABA, Chicago, IL), Aug. 2006, at 2.
359. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
360. See Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting Preemption in Environmental Law: An
Analysis of the Cost-Externalization Argument and California Assembly Bill 1493, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 269 (2009) (citing Felicity Barringer, A Coalition for Firm Limit on
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at C1).
361. Id. at 258.
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on and has passed more stringent auto and greenhouse emissions legislation
over recent decades.362
Two fears about California’s leadership have circulated. The first is
that the rules imposed in that state simply push the fiscal burden of
meeting those standards onto other states that may not benefit from them
so that, for instance, consumers of a certain automobile in Texas must
pay more for it to meet expectations of the California rule.363 Although a
popular argument, this “cost-externalization” critique has been criticized as
overblown.364 Second, proponents of ceiling preemption fear that without it
the states are free to adopt fifty different levels of emissions controls.365
The variance between California and states such as Michigan or Ohio
may be significant, but there is more to the picture. As some have said,
states are often quick to follow the lead of environmental mavericks in
clusters.366 So, for example, over twelve states have mercury controls,
twenty-eight states have renewable energy requirements of utilities, twenty
states took steps to reduce general greenhouse emissions, and nineteen
states have followed, or are considering following, California to exceed
EPA auto emissions controls.367
These growing clusters have been labeled “emerging consensus” and
merit special deference according to some.

362. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 588 (2001); Burgess, supra note 360, at 263
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2006)).
363. See Burgess, supra note 360, at 274.
364. Id. at 298.
365. Id. at 287 (citing Danny Hakim, California Leads on Warming, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2004, at C1).
366. See, e.g., David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental
Regulation, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2007, at 91, 96 (2007) (discussing the
influence of strict environmental jurisdictions, such as California, that exert pressure on
surrounding jurisdictions to adopt similar or equivalent regulations).
367. See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption when There Is an
“Emerging Consensus” of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
649, 649–50 (2008) (citing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets, CENTER FOR CLIMATE &
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/emissions-targets
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014)); Greenhouse Gas Reporting and Registries, CENTER FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/ghgreporting-and-registries (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); Renewable and Alternative Energy
Portfolio Standards, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/usstates-regions/policy-maps/renewable-energy-standards (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); State
Mercury Programs for Utilities, NAT’L ASS’N CLEAN AIR AGENCIES (Dec. 7, 2006),
http://www.4cleanair.org/Documents/StateTable.doc.
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In such cases, courts should apply the Supremacy Clause with more restraint
and should not imply congressional intent to preempt state environmental laws
absent a clear statement of preemptory language or a very clear and fundamental
conflict between federal and state laws. If Congress is firmly convinced that
adoption of a particular environmental policy by a growing number of states
would undermine the efficacy of a national regulatory scheme, then Congress
should clearly state its intention to preempt state action. Otherwise, implied
preemption should be applied narrowly in the environmental policy context in
order to recognize the states’ traditional police powers over public health and
safety and regulation of land uses.368

In application, this emerging consensus rule could prove complicated.
Conceivably, defining in terms of numbers or chronology the terms
consensus or emerging may further deepen the jurisprudential mire on
preemption. But in theory, and for reasons further spelled out below,
this approach to ceiling preemption in environmental regulation is right
on the mark. It seems to adopt not a rote, formalist application of
existing federalism jurisprudence but a realist, progressive approach that
incorporates federalism’s key purpose: a quest for the proper balance
between national and local legal culture. More importantly, it permits in
the field of environmental protection a state “race to the top” of a kind
that would achieve the EPA’s objectives more quickly and efficiently
than if the agency acted unilaterally or restrictively.369 The “clear statement
rule” advocated above has already been applied in several cases arising
over California and Vermont environmental policies.370 A similar thrust
pervaded the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which
allowed twelve states to successfully compel the EPA to enforce federal
greenhouse gas emissions rules.371
Although the Clean Air Act has prompted innovations such as State
Implementation Plans and a clear statement rule for emerging consensus
policies,372 the Clean Water Act (CWA) has been held not to preempt civil
damages for maritime accidents. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the
Court considered, among other things, whether common law punitive
damages levied against Exxon for its massive oil disaster in Prince
368. Learner, supra note 367, at 651.
369. See id. at 656.
370. Id. at 660 (citing Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp.
2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie,
508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007)).
371. 549 U.S. 497, 505 & n.2, 534 (2007).
372. See State Implementation Plans, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.
epa.gov/r02earth/air/sip (last updated Apr. 6, 2011).
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William Sound, Alaska in 1989 were preempted by the CWA.373 The
defendant company had already stipulated to the negligence of its
employee ship captain, and the trial court found it liable in respondeat
superior for the managerial acts of its employee in the scope of
employment.374 Exxon did not dispute its liability for compensatory
damages, and the punitive damages awarded at trial had already been
reduced on appeal at the Ninth Circuit.375 The Supreme Court found that
the CWA did not preempt punitive damages—much like compensatories—
but it remanded for a reassessment of the amount in light of common
law maritime damage rules.376
d. Employment
Finally, aspects of employment law have seen a number of high-profile
cases in which employers and insurance providers raised federal preemption
to fend off liability for torts related to workplace safety, wrongful
discharge, and employee benefits.
In 1974, Congress passed the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).377 The law came in response to several scandalous corporate
liquidations that left tens of thousands of employees unable to redeem
benefits to which they would have been entitled.378 The law was also
intended to create uniformity across our federal topography.379 Within
ERISA, at § 514(a), Congress included an express preemption clause
that precludes state laws that “relate to any employee benefit,” and perhaps
predictably, the courts struggled over the next decades to elaborate the
phrase “relate to.”380 Thus, in 1995’s New York Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Court considered a
New York public health law imposing surcharges on commercial
insurance providers—but not Blue Cross—that made the former more
expensive and less competitive.381 The district and appeals courts agreed
with Travelers and the other commercial insurer plaintiffs that the law
was preempted under ERISA, but the Supreme Court disagreed, finding
373. 554 U.S. 471, 476, 481 (2008).
374. Id. at 479–80.
375. Id. at 480–81 (citing In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236, 1246–47 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
376. Id. at 488–90, 513–15.
377. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 and 29 U.S.C.).
378. See James G. McMillan, III, Comment, Misclassification and Employer
Discretion Under ERISA, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 837, 840–41 (2000).
379. See id. at 842.
380. Employment Retirement Income Security Act § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006).
381. 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995).
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that in spite of § 514’s clear express preemption clause, the public health
law did not properly “relate to” employee benefits as that had come to be
understood in its decisions such as Shaw v. Delta.382 Again invoking the
presumption against preemption, the Court found that Congress’s intent
was indeed to “avoid a multiplicity of regulation” and “permit nationally
uniform” oversight but that Travelers was distinguishable because
surcharges directly affected only ultimate plan costs and not administrative
decisions as to benefits coverage.383
In 2004, the Court squarely considered common law tort preemption
under ERISA. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila saw two tort suits against health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the wake of public concern over
the rise of managed care and its attenuation of the physician-patient
relationship.384 The plaintiffs asserted negligence actions against insurance
providers Aetna and Cigna under the Texas Health Care Liability Act—a
statute that imposed a duty of ordinary care upon HMOs in making
treatment decisions.385 In the first suit, the HMO had refused to pay for
certain physician-recommended medication. The patient neither objected
nor purchased the drug and sought reimbursement, and the patient
took the alternative plan-covered medication before suffering a severe
reaction and requiring hospitalization.386 In the second suit, the HMO
refused to grant a patient’s physician-recommended, postoperative
request for an extended hospital stay after its own discharge nurse deemed
the request unsatisfactory. The patient was discharged on schedule and
suffered severe complications and required additional care.387 The majority
opinion authored by Justice Thomas found both claims preempted under

382. Id. at 651–53, 661–62 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 &
n.19 (1983); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 718 (2d Cir. 1994), rev’d, 514
U.S. 645; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev’d in part,
63 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1995)).
383. See id. at 657–58.
384. 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004); see also Susan Dorr Goold & Mack Lipkin, Jr., The
Doctor–Patient Relationship: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies, 14 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. S26, S26 (1999) (“The rapid penetration of managed care into the health
care market raises concern for many patients, practitioners, and scholars about the effects
that different financial and organizational features might have on the doctor-patient
relationship.”).
385. Aetna, 542 U.S. at 204–05 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 88.001–.003 (West 2004 Supp. Pamphlet)).
386. Id. at 205.
387. Id.
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§ 502(a) of ERISA.388 The Court quoted its own language from a prior
case:
“The detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt
and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging
the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the
inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal
scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress
rejected in ERISA. The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions
found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted provide strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly.”389

The Court was unanimous in finding express preemption of tort liability.390
But in a sharply terse concurrence, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
commented that “[b]ecause the Court has coupled an encompassing
interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force with a cramped construction
of the ‘equitable relief’ allowable under § 502(a)(3), a ‘regulatory vacuum’
exists: ‘Virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal
substitutes are provided.’”391 For some commentators, this elision of civil
redress would form the basis for a potential due process challenge.392
The foregoing has been an elliptical overview of select social and
industrial practices around which federal preemption cases have
clustered. It is by no means an exhaustive inventory of national approaches
to preemption and indeed leaves out important yet more complex areas
in which the Supreme Court has not yet resolved discrepancies among
the circuits and states on preemption. Even in cases in which the Court
granted certiorari, its holdings have often left preemption standards unclear
for the lower courts to apply.
In cases where federal law creates a remedy, one alternative to preemption
is exhaustion. Exhaustion theory says that to be eligible for the federal
remedy, a plaintiff must first pursue available administrative remedies.393
Then and only then, it holds, will a plaintiff’s claim properly become
federal. This requirement already exists in several areas. Title VII of

388. Id. at 204, 214.
389. Id. at 208–09 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
390. Id. at 202, 204.
391. Id. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
392. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 11, at 529.
393. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
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the Civil Rights Act, for instance, requires an employment discrimination
claim to first exhaust administrative procedures before being certified in
federal court.394 It has also been proposed for unsettled matters such as
federal review of governmental torts under the Takings Clause.395 Some
have argued that an exhaustion requirement can actually strengthen state
sovereignty by first entrusting immunity decisions to state courts.396
3. Sociocultural Denominators and Legal Geography
Under traditional federalism, federal legislative and judicial deference
to the states is premised upon social and cultural “fit” between the
creation and enforcement of local norms and the specific realities and
experience of the objects of those norms.397 When Congress asks state
court adjudicators to defer to federal law, it is in effect making a decision
about legal geography; in this or that substantive domain, it is saying, a
national norm is more desirable or efficient. As the pages above suggested,
the most highly developed areas in which this has taken place form welldefined subject matters or competencies.
In transportation and aviation, preference for national-in-scope norms
seems sensible on the basis of dynamism. People, goods, and machines
flow across state borders with ever-increasing speed and frequency.
Although this development would appear most obviously to track
technological change, we must not forget that it is also a preeminently
social phenomenon. People ride planes, trains, and automobiles to get to
other people for recreation, work, dealmaking, and education. As this
has increased, so too has demand for uniform liability rules for the systems
that manage these transport channels. As in other areas, uniformity here
serves to establish and manage expectations of care on the part of
prospective plaintiffs, but it also shapes expectations on the part of
prospective defendants such as automakers and airlines as to the scope
and nature of prospective liability. This is more significant than simple
predictability of corporate liability claims. It is also a matter of nationalizing
transport culture in a way that further facilitates movement itself.

394. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1294 n.28 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5(e)–
5(f) (2006)).
395. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 224, at 330.
396. See, e.g., id. at 332–33.
397. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2006).
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Food and drug cases also invoke movement and space. There, with
increasing frequency, consumable goods for human alimentation or
health and wellness move rapidly across state lines. Alternatively,
encounters with these products may also be more dynamic as a result of
faster human interstate migration. Two aspects of this movement are
significant. First, as with all mass-market dynamics, it is motivated by
efficiency so that either the end retailer seeks greatest profit or the end
user seeks to expend the fewest resources to benefit from the product.
Once technology permits rapid transportation, as above, this mutual will
to efficiency drives a search for goods from cheaper producers at everwider geographic orbits. Second, food and drug products are ingested
into the human body in ways that place recognition of their harm and its
etiology beyond the reasoning of laypersons. Thus, Red 40 or Vioxx
will affect their end users in ways they may be able to feel—
eventually—but not easily explain. This is only partly about expertise,
and indeed evidentiary complexity in such cases may be similar before
state or federal tribunals. It is also about ex ante behavior based on
informational transparency. Deference to individual state liability rules
in food and drug cases would not only allow highly variable rules about
risk disclosure, it could allow informational discrepancies to prevail
given that ideas decreasingly respect state borders. Thus, risk management
associated with these products is probably best accomplished through
centralization and ex ante regulatory controls, which are both embodied
in the current FDA regime. Notwithstanding disclosure fraud, it
may be preferable that the agency prescribe and enforce national care
levels and liability rules.
Medical devices are especially sensitive to preemption for several of
the same reasons. As they become cheaper and less invasive, they become
more accessible to the general public. As insurance providers cover an
increasing array of devices, laypersons are more likely to elect to use
them. And as the market—and profitability—for such devices increases,
they become more and more like high-tech consumer goods: part designer
status symbol, part cyborgian immortality, and part incomprehensible
cipher to the average user. The same reasoning about mass-market action
and harm can be applied to products liability cases. Although, it is
significant that products liability is a more varied subject area with
preemption recognized only in certain pockets requiring regulatory
control. The standard, run-of-the-mill products liability case still falls under
state common law. Indeed, this is one area where high variance prevails
across the states, some of which adhere to classic strict liability rules
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and some of which have adopted principles resembling the
Restatement (Third) of Torts’ negligence hybridization.398
So, in the introductory vignette above, where a little boy is burned by
a toy baking oven, the child can and probably should bring his claim
under state products liability for manufacturing or design defect. In that
action, he need show only that the product departed from intended design
or that the entire product line could have been made with a
reasonable alternative design. In the former claim, a jury may be asked
to decide whether there was such a departure or such a reasonable
alternative and then to assess damages based upon aggregate medical
expenses and pain and suffering. The manufacturer would resist these
assessments for two widely circulating reasons. First, how can civil juries
comprised of six to twelve lay individuals assess reasonable design
alternatives—particularly in higher technology products? Second, state
court juries tend to be more sympathetic to individual plaintiffs than to
abstract, wealthy corporations.399 If the defendant can remove to federal
court, it will likely attempt to do so. Better still, if it can access any
form of preemption argument, it will probably attempt to do that as well.
Although the Supreme Court has not established federal preemption for
compliance with federal toy safety regulations, it is conceivable under
current jurisprudence that it may one day do so.
VI. DEFENDING CURRENT CONTOURS
Modern application of First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and
federal preemption doctrines to state common law torts is still a highly
complicated proposition. In areas of defamation for example, it remains
uncertain how the New York Times standard is to apply to nonmedia
defendants.400 In governmental property torts, it is not clear how to
coherently distinguish a public taking from a fair exercise of police
power.401 And in application of Williamson, Altria, and Riegel, it will be
difficult to say with certainty whether state courts have faithfully
398. See Heather M. Bessinger & Nathaniel Cade, Jr., Who’s Afraid of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts?, WIS. L.J. (Sept. 17, 2010, 2:33 PM), http://wislawjournal.com/2010/09/17/
whos-afraid-of-the-restatement-third-of-torts/.
399. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Comment on Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing
Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 950 (1995)
(book review).
400. See supra Part V.A.1.
401. See supra Part V.A.2.
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reproduced the minute reasoning leading to implied conflict preemption
based on semantics.402
For at least these reasons, some wish to see full autonomy for state tort
doctrines or eventual displacement of common law claims in the name
of federal uniformity. The communitarian argument for autonomy holds
that individual justice is culturally contingent and thus justifiably subject
to community variance.403 Individual communities, then, are best suited
to assess liability and damage theories. And yet, the proper community of
any one plaintiff or defendant depends upon a cultural authenticity or
homogeneity that is becoming increasingly rare, increasingly suspect, and
normative rather than descriptive.404 Unitarians, on the other hand,
advocate for nationally uniform norms to promote “economies of scale.”405
Without such norms, they argue, mass-market actors cannot operate with
optimal efficiency and states are able to “externalize” economic costs of
higher care onto the remaining states and their consumers.406
Underlying each is a quest for an all-or-nothing approach that turns on
destruction or canonization of state common law autonomy. Such an
approach would likely be simpler to apply and more predictable for parties.
And, if compensation were the sole purpose of tort law, and if this system
were still construed primarily as private law, that goal would be paramount.
Yet the evolution of torts toward public law over the past century makes
prediction of individual liability less important. On the contrary, if torts
is public law, then its primary charge is to interpret and sanction proper
relations between political and social institutions, and resolution of
individual disputes becomes a salutary byproduct of this. In reality, as
Calabresi has suggested, torts jurisprudence is usually serving both roles.407
Therefore, the struggle to locate a proper balance between state and
federal authority is not an obstacle to tort law. It is and should be
recognized as one of the very functions of tort jurisprudence today. This
federalism function joins other well-established policy functions as another
among several priorities shaping individual decisions, as well as
intragovernmental institutional relationships. Like those other functions,
it may not be foregrounded in each and every dispute but rather may
interact with those in cases of unique significance to the topography of
American legal culture. Perhaps more importantly, then, the federalism

402. See supra Part V.B.
403. See supra notes 4, 33–34 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 31–32, 103–04 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption,
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1603 (2007).
406. Id. at 1608 & n.216 (citing Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 397, at 1385–89).
407. See Calabresi, supra note 37.
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function is the first of these policy functions to occupy itself directly
with the layout of American legal geography.
In addressing questions of legal geography, the federalism function
resists the all-or-nothing approaches described above. What it presupposes,
instead, is a contoured approach whereby certain sectors of our social
and economic life are better regulated on a federal level and others are
better addressed through local norms. Although generalization regarding
the common threads of federalization is admittedly fragile, the above
survey reveals a general trend toward federalization in areas of social
and economic life that demand a uniform national legal culture. From
the ethnoracial dynamics underlying New York Times to the high-tech
biopolitical dynamics of Lohr and Riegel, from the socially risqué subject
matter of Hustler Magazine to the fast interstate transportation dynamics
of Geier and Williamson, the lead cases on tort federalization all occupy
themselves in one form or another with tort harms amid rapid cultural
change resulting from new relationships with machines, physical space,
human “otherness,” and human physiology.
This raises still further questions. For instance, why are federal norms
better suited to fast changing social fields? Additionally, should social
change be the proper object of a nationalized legal culture? Though purely
theoretical, my answers for these queries rest on the interplay between law
and modern nationhood. A far cry from the putatively pure, premodern
tribal societies of Ancient Law, modern nation-states are geographically
dispersed, multicultural, polyglot complexes of human beings, communities,
institutions, and ideologies.408 Where once they coalesced through imputed,
shared, mythic national pasts, today the “imagined community” model is
confounded by rapid and ongoing movement facilitated by information
and technological advancements that not only alter regional demographics
quickly but also call into question the integrity of any form of shared
past, mythic or otherwise.409 It is these areas of social and economic
practice—ones elsewhere associated with globalization more generally—
that have become the predominant object of tort federalization. Put
otherwise, federalization of American civil justice has become a powerful
tool for nation-building in the age of global governance.

408.
409.

See MAINE, supra note 122.
See supra notes 31–32, 103–04 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The several states in the U.S. federal system have become front
lines for nation building through the growth of doctrines that permit
lower courts to refine the proper contours of American legal geography.
In this growth of cooperative federalism, the common law tort
system—an adjudication venue known to sit close to the ground where
law meets culture—has taken on an even more significant public law
role. Accordingly, federalism has risen as a significant—though still
nondeterminative—function of the tort system.
The choice between local and national norms is a choice between
heterogeneous and uniform legal cultures. If the evolutionary theories
are to be believed, uniformity was an important feature of early law as it
permitted the transition from cultural customs to legal proscriptions. As
European and American societies transitioned into industrial modernity,
they brought together disparate peoples into large states bound together
as nations through the circulation of common symbols, practices, and
historical memory. In the United States, the shared national past was
sufficiently strong to bind together fifty disparate states whose sovereignty
was shared with a remote federal government. Throughout the first
centuries of this history, this arrangement permitted significant state
autonomy in the development and application of tort law—liability for
civil wrongs ranging from harm to reputation and physical autonomy to
personal property and emotional well-being.
Over the past century, cultural homogeneity underpinning a common
American nationhood has become attenuated. This change has resulted
from greater migration of people and goods into and across the country,
as well as more rapid circulation of ideas and imagery through high-tech
advancements. Instead of bringing with them a concomitant increase in
state autonomy over civil liability disputes, these changes have wrought
greater federal influence into state common law rules and processes.
Through that influence, jurists have developed and served the federalism
function. Where other tort functions are preoccupied with economic
concerns such as cost spreading and optimal social utility, the federalism
function is an immanently cultural one: it seeks the proper arrangement
of American legal geography. Where some would prefer law to simplify
the world in which we live, the ingenuity of this approach lies in its
ability to instead mirror the complexity of that world. Through that mirror,
one sees an image in which norms operate most accurately on geographic
scales best suited to the discrete socioeconomic practices from which
they were born.
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